For decades, there has often been a gap between some United States federal foreign policy priorities and the views of many ordinary Americans. The current relationship between the US and China is no exception. While successive administrations have ratcheted up tensions with China — imposing tariffs, restricting technology exports, and waging a prolonged campaign against Chinese firms like TikTok — millions of people continued to use TikTok without a second thought about national security. Millions more have no animosity toward China. Yet the machinery of federal foreign policy grinds on, often in a direction that bears little resemblance to the preferences of the citizens it ostensibly serves.
This is not a new phenomenon. Throughout American history, the executive branch has pursued diplomatic and military objectives that were at odds with public opinion, from covert interventions during the Cold War to prolonged engagements in the Middle East. The difference now is that an alternative channel of diplomacy is emerging. That channel runs not through Washington, but through state capitals.
The concept of subnational diplomacy, the practice of state and local governments engaging directly with foreign nations on matters of trade, energy, education, and technology, is not entirely new, but it is entering a new and potentially transformative phase. The most striking recent example comes from the transatlantic one, and it offers a template that China, including the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, can study closely.
In a move that underscored the growing diplomatic ambitions of American governors, California’s Gavin Newsom traveled to London and signed a memorandum of understanding with UK Energy Secretary Ed Miliband pledging cooperation on clean energy technologies. The agreement went beyond symbolic goodwill. It aimed to expand market access for British firms, including an energy company in California, and to deepen collaboration between research institutions on both sides of the Atlantic. A spokesperson for the British Embassy framed the agreement not as a one-off but as part of a broader strategy, noting that similar energy memorandums had been signed at the state level with Florida and Texas.
The implications of this development are profound. Here is a foreign government, one of the US’ closest allies, to be sure, conducting what amounts to parallel diplomacy with individual US states, negotiating agreements that create real economic and institutional ties independent of whatever the federal government in Washington may or may not be doing.
This is where the lesson becomes especially relevant for China and the HKSAR. For years, China has promoted “citizen diplomacy” — cultural exchanges, academic partnerships, business-to-business relationships, and people-to-people contact — to foster goodwill. Citizen diplomacy has its merits, but it also has its limits. It is diffuse, difficult to coordinate, and vulnerable to the broader political climate. When Washington turns hostile, citizen diplomacy alone cannot sustain a relationship.
Beijing and Hong Kong should be looking not only at Washington but also at California, New York, and Florida. The goal would not be to circumvent federal policy — that would be both impractical and counterproductive — but to build durable relationships with state governments and state-level politicians who recognize the mutual benefits of engagement
State-level diplomacy offers something qualitatively different. US states possess enormous power. California, with a Gross State Product of over $4 trillion, has an economy larger than that of most nations. New York is one of the financial capitals of the world. These states have governors and legislatures that set policy on trade, investment, environmental regulation, education, and infrastructure, all areas where international cooperation can yield tangible benefits for their citizens. Crucially, state politicians are elected by and accountable to their own constituents, whose priorities may diverge significantly from those of the US president or Congress. A governor in an agricultural state that exports soybeans to China has a very different calculus than a senator positioning himself for a presidential run on an anti-China platform.
The constitutional structure of the US creates room for this kind of diplomatic pluralism. While the federal government retains exclusive authority over treaties, military alliances, and formal diplomatic recognition, states have broad latitude to enter into cooperative agreements, attract foreign investment, and send trade missions abroad. Governors routinely travel to foreign countries to court business. State economic development agencies maintain offices overseas. Universities, many of them public institutions governed by state boards, forge research partnerships with foreign counterparts. None of this requires the permission of the White House.
So Beijing and Hong Kong should be looking not only at Washington but also at California, New York, and Florida. The goal would not be to circumvent federal policy — that would be both impractical and counterproductive — but to build durable relationships with state governments and state-level politicians who recognize the mutual benefits of engagement. Trade and investment are the most obvious starting points. Chinese firms that manufacture electric vehicles, batteries, and solar panels could find willing partners in states eager to accelerate their clean energy transitions. Hong Kong, with its strengths in finance and professional services, could deepen ties with states looking to attract capital and expertise.
There is also a longer-term strategic dimension. State politicians do not remain state politicians forever. Governors become presidents. State legislators become members of Congress. A relationship cultivated at the state level today may prove invaluable at the federal level a decade from now. The United Kingdom clearly understands this. By signing memorandums with governors across the political spectrum, in blue California and red Texas alike, Britain is building a bench of American political leaders who have a personal and institutional stake in the transatlantic relationship. China, including the HKSAR, could adopt a similar approach, identifying states and politicians who are open to engagement and investing in those relationships.
None of this will be easy. Anti-China sentiment in American politics is bipartisan and deeply entrenched. But the political landscape is not monolithic. There are governors and mayors and state legislators who understand that their constituents benefit from trade with China; that their universities are enriched by Chinese students and researchers; and that diplomatic estrangement serves no one’s long-term interests. These leaders exist in both parties and in every region of the country.
The federal government will continue to set the broad contours of America’s relationship with China. But within those contours, there is far more room for maneuver than is commonly recognized. The British government has demonstrated that state-level diplomacy is not only possible but productive. In a political system as decentralized and complex as America’s, the path to a better relationship need not run entirely through the White House. It may run through the statehouses.
China should actively pursue state-level diplomacy with the US because it can generate concrete economic gains while building durable political goodwill that outlasts swings in federal policy. On the economic side, direct engagement with governors, state legislatures, and local economic development agencies can expand access to US regional markets, attract investment and partnerships, and create channels for pragmatic cooperation. Politically, sustained subnational outreach helps cultivate relationships with state and local leaders by focusing on shared, nonideological interests such as jobs, trade, education, and infrastructure; over time, these officials may become more inclined to view China as a constructive partner and, as many later move into Congress or executive roles, those early ties can translate into more informed and potentially more balanced national-level attitudes toward China.
The author is a consultant at the Global Hong Kong Institute.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
