Iarrived in Hong Kong to work (and, as it transpired, to make my home here) about two months after the first direct elections to the Legislative Council (LegCo), held in September 1991. Ever since I became a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, I have voted in every election.

The approach of the latest LegCo elections, slated for Sunday, set me thinking about the distressing frequency of Hong Kong’s disordered political experience over that period — and my own multidecade voting experience.

One key focus emerged from this reflection: the perception of a “loyal opposition” and what this term signifies.

The idea of a loyal opposition is most closely associated with Westminster-based systems of parliamentary government.

The concept first evolved in the United Kingdom as political power increasingly shifted away from the monarch and into the hands of the Westminster parliament. By the 1830s, this significant change was plainly established. Within this steadily evolving system, two major parties typically contested the right to form the government at general elections, where the franchise was initially conspicuously limited.

It was accepted that the opposition party would actively question and criticize the government. But it was also regarded as mandatory that the opposition party must share (with the government) a commitment to maintaining the existing constitutional order. A loyal opposition thus had to comport itself within these informal but very powerful guardrails.

As it happens, the applicability of this concept did not depend on the existence of a parliament-based form of government within the British Empire. Hong Kong provides a clear example confirming this.

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For some 150 years, the British administered Hong Kong by simply appointing the governor — and, indirectly, the government — for extended, unspecified terms. There was thus a complete absence of any form of dual-party parliament-based government.

However, over time, especially after its liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, Hong Kong came to enjoy significantly enhanced freedoms, not least enhanced media freedom, within the British-appointed governance system.

What also became clear was that this freedom-enhancing regime was subject to a clear loyal opposition norm. That is, the media and various residents could challenge and criticize the government, but they had to do so without directly challenging the constitutional framework of the colonial governance system.

When particular governance red lines were crossed, the British moved swiftly and forcefully to restrain such breaches of the loyal opposition expectations. They did so, for example, by suspending publications, by charging media operatives, and, in extreme cases like the political riots of 1966 and especially 1967, by applying lethal political force.

More recently, the immense political challenges Hong Kong has steadily faced, especially since 2010, culminating in the insurrection that gained traction from mid-2019, confirm how those most implacably opposed to the HKSAR government — and Beijing — evolved into an openly violent, disloyal opposition. They sought to upend the prevailing constitutional order, if possible, insisting that only their view of the correct political structures was admissible.

Beijing displayed exceptional impulse control in 2019. There was no resort to military force to restore order in Hong Kong. There was, however, an eventual resort to fundamental, radical legal reforms to bolster national security and to restructure LegCo. These needed reforms have been instrumental to restoring stability in the city.

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Critics home in on the requirement, now formally stated, that Hong Kong be “administered by patriots”. Yet this is simply what is implied by the venerable British loyal opposition stipulation: Opposition politicians operating within a Westminster parliamentary system are expected to be patriotically loyal to the prevailing constitutional order.

Those post-2019, far-reaching legal reforms implemented by Beijing and the SAR government in Hong Kong have, very importantly, once again provided us with a fully functioning legislature. The contrast with the previous, vigorously dysfunctional LegCo is stark. And we can see the steady, beneficial lift arising from this change across a range of pivotal issues, including Hong Kong’s serious housing, aged-care, and healthcare challenges.

LegCo is now more important than ever. It has reestablished itself as a primary institution that will play a central role in shaping Hong Kong’s future. It is a very good thing. This is why I look forward to casting my vote on Sunday, as I hope many others do.

The author is an adjunct professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.