For the second time in as many years, an American economist has pronounced Hong Kong dead — and, once again, in a wicked way. Stephen Roach, former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, has followed up on his infamous 2024 declaration that “Hong Kong is over” with a sequel bearing an even blunter title. He asserted in a recent article: The Hong Kong of Old is Over.

It is a cunning line. It is also, on close inspection, a rhetorical performance dressed in the language of economics. Strip away the flourish, and his argument collapses under the weight of the very facts it tries to explain away. Far from ending, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is opening a new chapter — and the evidence for that renewal is everywhere, if only Roach would care to take a look.

Roach’s central complaint concerns the source of Hong Kong’s revival. The city’s return to the top of global initial public offering rankings in 2025, he said, was driven by Chinese mainland firms’ listings such as CATL, Luxshare Precision, Z.ai, Momenta, and Montage Technology, leading him to conclude that Hong Kong is less a thriving global market than a platform for Chinese issuers.

Yet this reasoning betrays a weird distortion of how great financial centers work. New York does not become “less international” because American companies raise capital there; London does not forfeit its global standing by connecting British firms to global investors. Every mature financial hub is anchored in an economic hinterland. Hong Kong’s hinterland happens to be the mainland,  and turning that hinterland into a liability requires considerable ideological gymnastics.

So what is truly “over” is not Hong Kong but the flawed assumption that the city’s value depends on its distance from Beijing rather than on its unique ability to connect the mainland with the broader world. Hong Kong’s future lies precisely in serving its economic hinterland by leveraging its international-facing institutional strengths — a formula that the city’s critics, comfortable in their fatalism, seem unwilling to recognize

The numbers, moreover, tell a story of vibrancy rather than dependence. Funds raised in Hong Kong reached nearly HK$275 billion ($35 billion) from 106 initial public offerings in 2025, making the city the world’s top listing venue. That leadership was not narrow, and it was not accidental. It reflected the return of confidence to a market many observers had written off. More to the point, the money flowing in was global, not merely from the mainland. The resurgence underscored a revival of confidence from investors from not only the mainland but also overseas, with strong engagement from Asian, European, Middle Eastern and North American funds. A “captive” platform does not attract sovereign wealth funds from three continents. The HKSAR attracts them precisely because it remains the most efficient bridge between mainland growth and international capital.

Nor is the story confined to mainland firms. Enterprises with international roots have listed in Hong Kong precisely because they value the city’s role in enhancing global brand image and accessing the mainland market. That is not the profile of a local exchange but of an international financial hub whose next chapter is being written by global economic dynamics, not just by Beijing.

Roach’s second charge concerns the rule of law. He asserts that the national security laws implemented in 2020 and the Article 23 legislation in 2024 have compromised what was regarded as one of Hong Kong’s greatest institutional advantages. Here the double standard is glaring. National security laws are treated as a routine necessity in every Western jurisdiction — yet uniquely illegitimate when enacted in Hong Kong. These laws did not descend from nowhere; they followed the violent unrest of 2019-20 and they restored stability, without which no financial center can function.

That stability is measurable. Hong Kong’s economy grew 5.9 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026 — the strongest in nearly five years. Investors do not commit capital to a jurisdiction they do not trust. They commit it because Hong Kong’s courts still operate under common law and its markets still follow internationally aligned standards.

Then there is the “Xianggang” flourish itself — Roach’s suggestion that a Mandarin pronunciation somehow proves the city’s “demise”. This is provocation masquerading as analysis. Hong Kong has officially been “Xianggang” in Mandarin since the country standardized Hanyu pinyin in 1958; the name proves nothing about the city being “over”. Roach’s claim that one is now more likely to hear Mandarin than Cantonese in the street, which itself is an exaggeration, reflects nostalgia, not analysis. Moreover, what is wrong when more Mandarin-speaking professionals, students, and entrepreneurs show up in Hong Kong, a Chinese territory?

And the substance endures. Hong Kong remains a separate customs zone with its own currency pegged to the US dollar; its courts apply common law with judgments cited as precedent abroad; its professional services in law, arbitration, shipping, insurance, and asset management remain deeply international. These are not trivial. They are the core functions of an international financial hub, which does not lose its internationality simply because it operates under a sovereign state.

The SAR’s own officials have answered the charge directly. The acting financial secretary, Michael Wong Wai-lun, wrote that some critics appear driven more by bias against China than by objective analysis, with criticisms neither supported by evidence nor aligned with facts. He grounded that rebuttal in outcomes rather than rhetoric. In the latest Global Financial Centres Index, the city maintained its position as third globally, achieving a higher score than in the previous report. And he pointed to a deepening ecosystem beneath the headline numbers. Net inflows into local-domiciled authorized funds reached HK$357 billion, single-family offices surpassed 3,380, and the Office for Attracting Strategic Enterprises secured over 120 key firms projected to generate HK$73 billion in investment. These are not the signs of a dying city. They are indicative of a robust commercial hub’s economic prowess.

So what is truly “over” is not Hong Kong but the flawed assumption that the city’s value depends on its distance from Beijing rather than on its unique ability to connect the mainland with the broader world. Hong Kong’s future lies precisely in serving its economic hinterland by leveraging its international-facing institutional strengths — a formula that the city’s critics, comfortable in their fatalism, seem unwilling to recognize. The “fragrant harbor” still trades, still thrives, and still welcomes the outside world. Its next chapter is just beginning. One need only visit to witness it firsthand.

The author is the convenor at China Retold, a member of the Legislative Council, and a member of the Central Committee of the New People’s Party.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.