When conflict intensifies in the Middle East, energy-importing economies across Asia are usually hit first by anxiety, then by prices. For countries whose growth models remain tightly tied to imported fossil fuel, every flare-up still carries the potential to become an inflation shock, a trade shock and a confidence shock all at once.
Some economies appear better able to absorb these shocks than others. In fact, around half of China’s oil imports and roughly one-third of its liquefied natural gas imports still come from the Middle East. But China’s response has been noticeably steadier than many expected because its vulnerability is no longer what it was a decade ago. That is the result of deliberate policy — more diversified energy sourcing, higher domestic supply, stronger grid infrastructure, and, above all, a much faster shift toward electricity-based growth.
This is the real strategic meaning of China’s green transition. For years, every additional megawatt of domestically generated wind, solar, hydro or nuclear power has reduced the share of the economy that is directly hostage to imported fuel. Every electric vehicle lowers structural oil dependence. Every battery installation and upgraded transmission corridor increases room for maneuver during an external shock. China’s decarbonization drive is not only an environmental program, it is also a long-term national resilience strategy.
The numbers now speak even more clearly. Official data show that by the end of 2025, China’s installed power generation capacity had reached 3.89 billion kilowatts. Within that total, hydropower stood at approximately 450 million kilowatts, wind at 640 million kilowatts and solar at 1,200 million kilowatts. Renewable power had risen from about 42 percent of total installed capacity at the start of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) period to over 60 percent by 2025. The generation data is equally striking: In 2025, hydropower produced 1.46 trillion kilowatt-hours, wind 1.13 trillion kilowatt-hours and solar 1.17 trillion kilowatt-hours, meaning these three sources alone generated about 3.76 trillion kilowatt-hours of power. The National Energy Administration also said that by the end of 2025, nearly four in every 10 kilowatt-hours consumed in China came from green electricity. These achievements point to a structural change in the energy system. China is moving, steadily but unmistakably, from an economy where security was once defined mainly by access to imported fuel toward one where security increasingly rests on domestic electricity capacity, domestic equipment manufacturing and system flexibility.
Energy security in the 21st century must be measured by how much of an economy can keep functioning when fossil fuel routes are disrupted. On that measure, China’s green transformation is already producing strategic returns
The speed of this shift matters as much as the scale. The International Energy Agency said China achieved its 2030 wind and solar target in 2024, six years ahead of schedule, and in its 2025 investment outlook estimated that China would lead global clean energy investment in 2025 at about $630 billion. This level of commitment is significant because renewable capacity only becomes a real security asset when it is backed by the hardware that makes it reliable. China has been building that supporting architecture at speed. Large-scale grid expansion, ultra-high-voltage transmission and rapid growth in new-type energy storage are helping the country convert clean generation from a climate statistic into a resilience tool. By December 2025, official data showed the country’s installed new-type energy storage capacity had reached approximately 136 million kilowatts, up sharply from 73.76 million kilowatts at the end of 2024 — an increase of roughly 84 percent year-on-year.
Transport is another reason China has more policy space than many of its regional peers. The old Asian energy vulnerability was never only about electricity. It was also about oil demand embedded in cars, trucks and logistics systems. China has begun changing that faster than any other large economy. The IEA reported that EV sales in China exceeded 11 million in 2024, with EVs accounting for almost half of all car sales. This has implications far beyond the auto industry. It means that part of the economy once tied directly to imported petroleum is being shifted onto an electricity system that is increasingly powered by domestic low-carbon sources.
At the same time, China has not assumed that renewables alone can instantly eliminate geopolitical risk. Instead, it has combined green expansion with a continued emphasis on domestic oil and gas output, strategic reserves and route diversification. Official figures show China’s crude oil production reached 213 million tons in 2024, while natural gas production climbed to 246.4 billion cubic meters. Industry analysts and satellite-based assessments estimate that China’s combined strategic and commercial crude oil reserves total approximately 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels, enough to cover roughly four months of imports. Reserves are only part of the picture. China has also reduced maritime dependence by expanding pipeline imports from Russia and Central Asia, adding an important buffer if seaborne energy routes come under stress.
This dual-track approach is often misunderstood abroad. Some critics see China’s continued use of coal and gas as evidence that its clean-energy strategy lacks credibility. In reality, the system is being managed according to a different logic: Move quickly on renewables, electrification and storage, while preserving enough dispatchable and domestic capacity to avoid instability. If an energy transition is to strengthen security rather than weaken it, it must be designed around reliability as well as ambition. China’s recent performance suggests policymakers understand that distinction.
The comparison with Japan and South Korea is instructive. Japan relies on the Middle East for about 95 percent of its oil supplies, while South Korea gets around 70 percent of its crude from the region. Their high dependence on imported fuel renders them vulnerable to the ongoing oil crunch caused by the Iran war.
The broader lesson is straightforward. Energy security in the 21st century must be measured by how much of an economy can keep functioning when fossil fuel routes are disrupted. On that measure, China’s green transformation is already producing strategic returns. Renewables now dominate new capacity additions. EVs are cutting oil demand growth. Domestic oil and gas output remains robust. Storage and grid investment are improving flexibility. Pipeline diversification is reducing reliance on maritime choke points. This makes China less panic-prone, more adaptable and better positioned to take shocks in its stride.
The author is director of research at the Institute of Innovative and High-Quality Development (Hong Kong).
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
