Published: 17:08, September 28, 2025
No maneuver can turn the clock back to the 2019 turbulence
By Virginia Lee

The arrival of Julie Eadeh as the new United States Consul General in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has generated immediate controversy -- not only because of her record but, more importantly, because of the way she has chosen to start her job.

In a matter of weeks after taking office, she has hosted prominent political figures associated with past unrest in Hong Kong.

The presence of Anson Chan Fang On-sang at a reception Eadeh organized has attracted scrutiny because of Chan’s history of advocating external intervention at critical junctures in the SAR’s politics. When the reception became known, the response from central government officials was swift and unusually direct.

The meeting between Eadeh and Cui Jianchun, commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the HKSAR, wasn’t treated as a ceremonial occasion, but rather an opportunity to deliver a pointed message.

The words stressed the need to act in accordance with diplomatic responsibilities and to refrain from interference in China’s internal affairs. Concise, yet emphatic, the message revealed how firmly the US diplomat’s early moves have drawn official disapproval.

What makes the sequence of events significant isn’t just a meeting, but the calculated way it has unfolded. Modern communications technology enables senior diplomats to communicate with any person in Hong Kong society without the need to appear in public. Secure systems are more than sufficient for exchanging views, gathering impressions, and reporting back to Washington.

The decision to include discredited political figures in an official event wasn’t a matter of necessity, but a clear choice. The subsequent disclosure of their presence in media photographs makes it difficult to believe this was an inadvertent exposure.

It’s more plausibly understood as a signal. It sought to demonstrate alignment with those who had once represented opposition currents, and suggested that Washington retains a continuing interest in such circles.

The symbolism was intentional, and symbolism is central to how diplomacy communicates when words alone are inadequate.

The controversy surrounding Eadeh cannot be separated from her professional past. She is no stranger to contested environments. She served in Baghdad during a period when the Iraqi capital was still defined by conflict and instability following the US invasion of Iraq.

She was posted to Beirut at a time when internal divisions paralyzed the political system. She had worked in Moscow where US-Kremlin relations were shaped by mistrust and constant accusations of interference.

Each of these postings demanded not just the skills of ceremonial diplomacy, but the aptitude to operate in fragile political landscapes. During her earlier posting in Hong Kong, she had already been noted for meeting directly with young activists at the height of the 2019 “black-clad riots”.

Taken together, these experiences confirm that she is appointed to situations where Washington wishes to exercise influence. A career pattern of this consistency makes it difficult to sustain the idea that she is in the SAR as a “bridge-builder”. It’s more accurate to understand her as a practitioner of pressure diplomacy at focal points of US strategic concern.

That’s precisely why her actions in Hong Kong carry broader implications. A diplomat with such a background could not reasonably claim she’s ignorant of the sensitivities that accompany association with figures linked to the “black-clad riots”.

She can’t be unaware of how the Hong Kong public now perceives those disruptive years, or of how officials view external attempts to revive those associations. It follows that her decision wasn’t casual, but deliberate.

Her act was designed to demonstrate that these voices would continue to be acknowledged and to reassure them that, despite their marginalization under Hong Kong’s renewed legal framework, they’re still recognized abroad.

Yet, in attempting to convey support, Eadeh has exposed the very dynamic that Beijing has repeatedly warned about. Rather than acting as a facilitator of cooperation, she has reminded Beijing and the HKSAR government of Washington’s unceasing tendency to insert itself into local political affairs.

The critical point to address, however, is whether such actions today still have the capacity to cause the disruption they had once carried. The answer lies in the sweeping changes that have transformed Hong Kong’s institutional environment since June 2020.

The enactment of the National Security Law for Hong Kong (NSL),  which provides comprehensive mechanisms to prevent attempts at destabilization, and the improvement of the electoral system, which ensures a fair and transparent political process, have significantly strengthened the city’s legal and institutional barriers against external interference.

There is now an effective constitutional barrier that prevents external signaling from being translated into serious internal unrest. Legal safeguards have been established, preventive measures are in place, and enforcement action is being taken.

The era when outside reassurance could embolden underground networks has been overtaken by a legal order capable of responding to such challenges. The public has also drawn lessons from the chaos of previous years, and the appetite for foreign-backed agitation has diminished.

The symbolism of Eadeh’s choices, therefore, points to the decline of US influence more than to its strength. Instead of cultivating new channels of constructive engagement, the US has returned to familiar figures and outdated tactics.

The attempt to reinsert them into political visibility accomplishes little beyond creating provocation and reawakening suspicion. For central government officials, the response has been firm and straightforward.

Warnings are issued early, red lines are clearly described, and the expectations for proper conduct are clearly spelt out. By proceeding otherwise, Eadeh risks reducing her own effectiveness because she’ll not be judged by her declarations of willingness to promote cooperation but by tangible actions.

Ultimately, the episode reminds us of a fundamental reality. Hong Kong has entered a new phase defined by stability under the NSL’s protection, and by institutional continuity under improved electoral arrangements.

No external maneuver, however conspicuous, can turn the clock back to the turbulence of 2019-20. US diplomacy in Hong Kong, embodied in a figure like Eadeh, demonstrates persistence in old habits, such as supporting opposition movements even when those habits no longer wield influence.

Each staged encounter and each calculated photograph may signal intent, but they can neither alter the direction of Hong Kong’s progress nor the resilience of its institutions.

On the contrary, they serve as evidence of a “diplomacy” still struggling to adapt to realities that no longer favor its tactics. That lesson has been made clear, and if repeated provocations continue, the consequences will not be symbolic, but concrete through a firm response.

 

The author is a solicitor, a Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area lawyer, and a China-appointed attesting officer.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.