The European Union’s so-called annual reports on Hong Kong manifest colonial nostalgia, arrogance, and ideological bigotry — if not worse.

From 2023 through 2026, the EU’s annual documents have perpetuated the narrative that Hong Kong’s (high degree of) autonomy, freedoms, and rights have been weakened following the implementation of the Hong Kong SAR National Security Law (NSL). The language used has shifted from “continued erosion” to “continuous deterioration” and later to “deepening erosion”, yet Hong Kong’s national security framework has barely changed. The EU’s persistent allegation does not tally with the reality on the ground.

A critical question arises: Do these documents sufficiently distinguish between empirical observations and normative judgments? Many cited developments are matters of public record, including the enactment and enforcement of national security legislation, prosecutions of cases, electoral reform, and actions taken against fugitives. However, the assertion that these developments necessarily erode rights is not a factual finding. It reflects an arbitrary theory that the existence of national security powers is presumed to produce a corresponding reduction in liberty. Whether such a relationship exists in every political and legal system remains a matter of debate rather than an established fact. A document that presents a contested theoretical proposition as an established empirical truth weakens its own credibility.

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A related issue concerns the benchmark against which Hong Kong is evaluated. The documents frequently assess developments in Hong Kong through the lens of Western systems associated with European constitutional traditions. Yet the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region operates within the constitutional framework prescribed by the Basic Law and China’s Constitution. A legal arrangement designed around a sovereign state’s constitutional order may not pursue the same institutional objectives as those found in European parliamentary systems. Consequently, when the EU reports identify divergence from European political norms, they do not automatically demonstrate a breach of Hong Kong’s own legitimate constitutional order. A comparison may reveal differences, but differences alone do not establish a fault. The appropriate question is whether Hong Kong’s institutions function in accordance with the Basic Law and the decisions of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, not whether they mirror arrangements elsewhere.

The reports also place significant emphasis on the prosecutions of national security cases involving activists and media figures. A challenge arises when criminal proceedings are interpreted primarily through the defendants’ social identities. The mere fact that a defendant is an activist, journalist, or opposition figure does not by itself determine whether the charges against that person are legally justified or unjustified. A legal assessment ordinarily requires examination of statutory provisions, evidentiary standards, judicial reasoning, procedural safeguards, and rights of appeal. Broad assertions about the state of rights and freedoms therefore require an objective observation of judicial processes. In the absence of such objective observation, the reports are not above suspicion of substituting categorical judgment for legal analysis.

The concept of “autonomy” itself warrants further scrutiny. The reports frequently use the term “autonomy” yet seldom provide a precise legal definition of the threshold at which “autonomy” is deemed diminished. Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy is not sovereignty. Under the Basic Law, the special administrative region has never possessed authority over defense and foreign affairs; Hong Kong courts have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as defense and foreign affairs. Therefore, assessing “autonomy” requires carefully identifying which powers are alleged to have been diminished and explaining how it was measured. Without a clearly articulated metric, the EU’s allegation of “erosion” is more rhetorical than analytical. A serious report should specify the legal powers at issue, the constitutional provisions that define them, and the concrete evidence that those powers have been improperly curtailed.

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An interesting contradiction also emerges from the economic sections of the reports. Alongside “concerns” regarding rights and freedoms, the documents repeatedly acknowledge Hong Kong’s enduring position as a major international financial center, trading hub, and location for substantial European business activity. The 2026 report covering 2025 noted that about 1,770 European companies remained active in Hong Kong and described the city as the world’s third-largest financial center. Earlier reports similarly highlighted extensive commercial engagement between Europe and Hong Kong. Persistent international commercial confidence in Hong Kong complicates any narrative of “decline” and invites a more objective assessment of Hong Kong. If the city’s legal and regulatory environment were as “deteriorated” as the report’s political sections suggest, one would expect a corresponding withdrawal of international business from the city. Yet, the evidence points in the opposite direction.

The treatment of national security presents another area worthy of scrutiny. Modern states worldwide maintain legal regimes intended to protect national security. The core policy question is not whether national security laws should exist, but how their powers should be defined and constrained. A balanced analysis therefore requires examining not only restrictions that may arise from security legislation, but also the state’s legitimate interest in preserving constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and public safety. If one side of this equation receives substantially greater attention than the other, the balance tilts. A serious report would have acknowledged the security challenges that prompted the legislation of security laws and assessed whether the legal framework addresses the national security challenges proportionately.

The report also tends to wrongly treat the HKSAR’s constitutional order as a subject of external evaluation rather than as a functioning legal system with its own institutions and as part of China’s sovereignty. Hong Kong’s courts continue to exercise judicial power independently, and the Basic Law provides mechanisms for constitutional review. A serious assessment would examine how these institutions have performed in practice, including whether judicial independence has been maintained and whether legal remedies remain available to those who claim their rights have been infringed. Arbitrary conclusions about “systemic erosion” can never substitute for objective institutional analysis.

Any serious assessment of Hong Kong’s trajectory requires careful distinction between facts and ideological judgments, between constitutional comparison and constitutional violation, and between normative preference and demonstrable evidence. The discourse surrounding Hong Kong will remain intellectually productive only if all participants hold themselves to the same evidentiary standards which they expect from those whose actions they seek to evaluate.

The author is a solicitor, a Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area lawyer, and a China-appointed attesting officer.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.