When Deng Xiaoping presented China’s fundamental formula for resuming its exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong to the United Kingdom in the early 1980s, it was called “one country, two systems”. This ordering of the key elements made it clear that “one country” was the primary governing concept within which the “two systems” would coexist. 

The longest-serving governor of Hong Kong (1971-1982) under British rule, Sir Murray MacLehose, raised the question of the durable future of Hong Kong with Deng in 1979. Extended negotiations leading to the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 followed. Still, MacLehose knew well before that Beijing was planning to resume the exercise of sovereignty over all of Hong Kong from July 1, 1997, following the expiration of the New Territories lease.

In June 1997, shortly before the handover, MacLehose gave an interview reflecting on his years spent in Hong Kong and the approaching resumption of exercise of sovereignty. During this extended interview, he said that if he had, “done a Patten, there wouldn’t have been a Joint Declaration.” 

MacLehose was referring to the wholesale, radical reforms the last British governor, Chris Patten, applied to Hong Kong’s electoral system shortly before the handover. These changes were contrary to previously agreed precepts forged by London and Beijing, and they contravened the essential spirit of both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Patten’s actions injected a much-amplified level of mistrust into the handover process. Unlike MacLehose, Patten demonstrated a rash disregard for the central importance of the “one country” grundnorm (basic norm) within the “one country, two systems” formula.

After arriving in Hong Kong in late 1991, it took me some time to understand how central “one country” was within the foundations underpinning the new Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. By 2010, however, I could see how political reform activism was growing more fevered (and dogmatic) and shaped by more extreme elements within the pro-democracy movement — and how this challenged the central substance of “one country”. 

I found that reading the best-known book by the prominent, Hong Kong-based Australian writer, Richard Hughes, was also instructive. This book, Borrowed Place Borrowed Time: Hong Kong and its Many Faces, was first published in 1968 (revised edition 1976). On the very first page, Hughes states that “Hong Kong is China”. He repeats this conclusion twice more in the same book. Hughes was one of the best-known journalists based in Hong Kong at the time. He died in 1984 after reporting from Asia for most of his life. Hughes was also believed to be a spy who worked for Britain’s MI6. 

Hong Kong today is no longer the “place of fear” it was in 2019. The HKSAR government is now also moving to enact additional, buttressing national security laws satisfying its obligation to do so under Article 23 of the Basic Law

The passage of time has confirmed that Hughes was not just an accomplished writer but also an acute observer. Well before “one country, two systems” was advocated as the basic principle to govern the resumption of exercise of full Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong, Hughes had nailed the fundamental core of that principle: Hong Kong was an intrinsic, inalienable part of one country.

Unfortunately, over a decade ago, opposition stipulations for an expedited overhaul of the HKSAR electoral system became ever more unbending. Anything less than their insistent, venerated demands was labeled as unacceptable. For this group, “two systems” trumped “one country”. 

The crumbling of a mature, measured approach within the opposition to the political development of the HKSAR was evident by 2010. Extreme elements within that camp increasingly set the debate agenda. They not only attacked the HKSAR government but also the more moderate elements within the opposition. This period confirmed how a pivotal weakness in the prime leadership of the opposition ultimately proved to be a grave misfortune for Hong Kong. By the time of the massive “Occupy Central” disruption in 2014, it was plain that, as they say, the extremist tail was wagging the dog. And the worst was yet to come.

When the HKSAR government moved to reform Hong Kong’s extradition regime in 2019 —as the Financial Action Task Force (created by the G7 in 1989) had long advocated — protest marches followed, which were widely encouraged by the media.

Very soon, major political rioting spun off from these marches. Within a few weeks, Hong Kong found itself in the grip of a growing, intensely violent, and destructive extended insurrection aimed, as the former judge of the Court of Final Appeal, Henry Litton, said, at the overthrow of the HKSAR government. 

Leading opposition figures vigorously sought direct support from the United States in this insurgency, right at the time the US was ramping up its new, central project to contain the rise of China.

This vehement movement critically infringed on the rights and well-being of millions of people in Hong Kong. Once more, relevant adversarial leadership figures failed to speak out to protect Hong Kong.

Meanwhile, the mainstream Western media, which concurrently labeled the seven-hour January 6 deadly attack on the US Congress in 2021 an “insurrection”, continued to insist that the vastly more damaging political riots which Hong Kong endured for over seven months, from June 2019, were “pro-democracy protests”.

The ill-omened failure of the political opposition to grasp what was so clear to Hughes well over 50 years ago — and to MacLehose — helped lay the foundations for the erosion of political functionality in Hong Kong, especially after 2010. This, in turn, ultimately led to the devastating insurrection in 2019. This destructive political digression — within the context of the manifest US project to contain the rise of China — directly prompted the introduction of major legal reforms.

After extended consideration following the political riots, Beijing moved to apply certain required radical legal reforms in Hong Kong, including the National Security Law for Hong Kong (NSL). These reforms have restored stability in the HKSAR and created a transformed political-governance system. Hong Kong today is no longer the “place of fear” it was in 2019. The HKSAR government is now also moving to enact additional, buttressing national security laws satisfying its obligation to do so under Article 23 of the Basic Law.

Over the last decade, Hong Kong has experienced an extended period of grave political upheaval. It could have been essentially avoided if the principal leaders of Hong Kong’s political opposition (and Patten) had, like Hughes and MacLehose, understood and accepted the overriding principle that Hong Kong is an intrinsic, inalienable part of one country and acted accordingly. Unfortunately, they failed to do this.

The author is an adjunct professor in the Faculty of Law of Hong Kong University. 

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.