On March 11, the National People’s Congress, with an overwhelming majority and amid loud applause by the deputies, passed a historic decision to fundamentally reform Hong Kong’s electoral system, changing the electoral arrangements for the Election Committee, the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council in major ways. This is the first time after Hong Kong’s return to the motherland that the central authorities have taken the initiative and the lead to reform Hong Kong’s electoral system. This top-down approach reflects the sense of urgency, crisis and responsibility on the part of Beijing to terminate at one fell swoop Hong Kong’s turmoil and bring about long-term political stability and effective governance.

Irrationality and dogmatism will be replaced by rationality and pragmatism. These changes in the political culture of Hong Kong will be conducive to the stability of Hong Kong and cordial relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing

At the center of this comprehensive reform package is the decision to provide a strong institutional guarantee to “patriots governing Hong Kong” through further empowering and enlarging the Election Committee, which after the reform is responsible not only for electing the Chief Executive of the HKSAR, but also a substantial percentage of legislators. People who want to be nominated as candidates in the Legislative Council and Chief Executive elections also have to obtain endorsements from a portion of members of the Election Committee. After reorganization and further empowerment, the Election Committee will be fully dominated by patriots. Given the institutional linkages between the Election Committee as well as the legislature and the Hong Kong government, both the government and the legislative will also be under the leadership of patriots.

After the electoral system of Hong Kong has been fundamentally reformed, Hong Kong politics will also undergo drastic and long-term changes. These changes together will enable the “one country, two systems” policy of China to be implemented comprehensively and accurately and to the benefit both of the country and Hong Kong. Inasmuch as the electoral reform is driven by the determination of the central authorities to forestall internal and external hostile forces from participating in Hong Kong’s elections and thereafter in the governing of Hong Kong, safeguarding national security is a major consideration in the design of the measures in the electoral reform. If Hong Kong’s elections will not result in hostile internal and external forces taking over the Hong Kong political regime, the central authorities in the future will be more willing and feel more at ease to allow Hong Kong’s electoral system to change in the future in the direction of further “democratization” and meeting Hong Kong people’s political aspirations.

Apart from protecting national security, the reformed electoral system of Hong Kong will also reshape Hong Kong politics in several significant ways.

Firstly, as internal and external hostiles are expelled from Hong Kong’s governance structure and as patriots dominate all the governance bodies of Hong Kong, effective governance will come about from a more cooperative relationship between the executive branch and the legislature. The political bases of support of the government and the legislature will converge and their policy differences will also narrow. With the staunch support of the central government and collaborative efforts of the government and the legislature, Hong Kong from now on can concentrate on tackling the deep-seated and long-standing economic, social and livelihood problems and bringing about a fairer and most just society.

Secondly, the balance of political forces in Hong Kong will change forever. The once-powerful and intransigent political opposition in Hong Kong will decline and crumble very rapidly. The reformed electoral system will encourage and make room for the rise of the loyal opposition, meaning those people and organizations that respect the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, abide by the Chinese Constitution and the Hong Kong Basic Law, reject violence and refuse to collude with external forces. At the same time, more people who aspire for a meaningful political career will be attracted to the patriotic camp. Apart from not being able to participate in Hong Kong’s governance, the disloyal opposition in Hong Kong cannot even engage in confrontational actions because of the National Security Law for Hong Kong. Political stability in Hong Kong can be restored “permanently”.

Thirdly, Western political forces will no longer have a role in Hong Kong politics. The Hong Kong National Security Law has already shrunk substantially the room to manoeuvre for the Western forces. The reformed electoral laws will further constrain the ability of Western forces to affect the electoral outcomes in Hong Kong. In particular, Hong Kong politicians will no longer be allowed to receive financial and other support from foreign forces.

Fourthly, the dominant issues in the public agenda will change in the medium run. Hong Kong has been plagued by the issues of political and electoral reforms before and after its return to the motherland. As a result of the propaganda and activities of external and internal hostile forces, nonpolitical issues pertaining to Hong Kong’s long-term development and well-being have been displaced by those politically explosive and divisive issues. After the reformed electoral system is well established, the weakened and fractured opposition forces in Hong Kong will no longer be able to set the public agenda for Hong Kong.

Fifthly, with the demise of the opposition, the patriots in the legislature and in society will no longer need to place emphasis on struggling with the opposition as the way to garner appreciation and support from the central authorities and the electorate. From now on, the central authorities will expect the patriots to demonstrate the ability to govern, to chart new policies, to pursue needed policy reforms, to educate the public on the real interpretation of “one country, two systems”, to check and balance the government in a constructive fashion, and to widen and deepen the social basis of the patriotic camp.

Lastly, the political culture and behavior of some Hong Kong people will also change gradually and significantly. They will no longer endorse violence as the means to attain political goals. Their support for the local opposition and outside forces will dissipate. They will no longer misjudge the position and behavior of the central authorities. They will no longer believe in the avowals of external and internal hostile forces that the central authorities will succumb to public pressure, Western threats and sanctions. Instead, a certain degree of respect and healthy “awe” for the central authorities will emerge. People will be more willing to take into account the interests and security of the country. Irrationality and dogmatism will be replaced by rationality and pragmatism. These changes in the political culture of Hong Kong will be conducive to the stability of Hong Kong and cordial relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing.

All in all, as a large-scale political engineering project, electoral reform inaugurated by the central authorities will terminate the vicious political cycle in Hong Kong, replace it with a virtuous political cycle and put the process of democratization in Hong Kong on a more solid and enduring basis.

This author is a professor emeritus of sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and vice-president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.