One of the core features of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s political structures is the executive-led system, which is good for effective governance and embodies the design of the SAR’s constitutional order. We have to admit that the executive-led system has not been accurately implemented so far because Hong Kong’s political ecology has endured profound changes before and after the handover, especially in the executive-legislative relationship. Examining that change is likely to help us better understand this system.
For the sake of political and social stability after the handover, maintaining Hong Kong’s system has been the consensus of Beijing and London, as evidenced by the Sino-British Joint Declaration; and this principle is reflected in the Basic Law. The executive-led political structure practiced during the colonial era is also part of the political system to be preserved. Under this institutional system, the executive, legislative and judicial branches carry out their functions and complement each other in accordance with the Basic Law. Consequently, the HKSAR Chief Executive has essentially inherited the previous colonial governors’ constitutional powers to perform his or her duties conferred by the Basic Law. Such as, the Chief Executive shall be the head of the SAR and its government; appoint members of the Executive Council; decide on government policies and issue executive orders, etc.
During the British colonial era, the governor was the core of power in a political architecture featuring executive-legislative fusion and bureaucrats-elites cooptation. “Administrative absorption of politics” generally epitomizes the colonial political system and governance structure. The process of collaboration or collusion between administrative bureaucrats and business elites facilitated the governor’s job. Furthermore, the governor is also the head of both the Executive Council and Legislative Council; he can nominate and appoint some trustworthy elites who act as advisers and would never challenge him. The ruling elites can always reach a consensus and minimize differences, thus a highly efficient executive-led governing system was able to be implemented. In addition, the British Hong Kong government launched some social reforms since the 1970s to mitigate public discontent and antagonism, which were conducive to neutralizing institutionalized political challenges from civil society. As a consequence, elite integration facilitated a highly fused relationship of executive-legislative and the constitutional order of the Hong Kong colony was an “administrative state” in substance.
The executive-led system has not been implemented comprehensively post-1997. The traditional form of the political system of “administrative state” can no longer be sustainable because the structural context changed after the handover
However, the executive-led system has not been implemented comprehensively post-1997. The traditional form of the political system of “administrative state” can no longer be sustainable because the structural context changed after the handover. It seems that the past governance philosophy is also incompatible with the new era. There is a strained and uncertain relationship between the executive and legislative branches, bureaucrats and elites, government and society, political appointees and British-groomed civil servants, etc. At the same time, not only is the Chief Executive pestered by the so-called legitimacy issue; the SAR government is restrained in formulating and implementing policies because of antagonistic politics.
Indeed, the relationship of executive-legislative shifting from fusion to disjunction is one of the most critical factors that challenge the executive-led system, and this relationship changed gradually during the transition period to the establishment of the SAR. Since 1984, the British Hong Kong government promoted so-called “decolonization” or “democratization” measurements to change Hong Kong’s political ecology with the aim of transforming the city into an independent political entity similar to Singapore. The last governor, Chris Patten, launched a comprehensive reform package in his policy address titled “Our Next Five Years”. As a result of his radical reforms, the legislature was separated from the executive in 1993 for the first time, with the governor no longer serving as the president of the Legislative Council; and then in 1995, the Legislative Council scrapped all the appointed seats, which were replaced by direct or indirect elections. With more and more elected seats in the Legislative Council, it gradually became a major countervailing force to the executive branch. Legislators are keen on using their voting power to counterbalance the executive because political parties have no direct constitutional powers to govern Hong Kong.
Overall, the executive-legislative disconnection is one of the root causes that undermines the executive-led system
On the other hand, according to the Chief Executive Election Ordinance, the CE should not have any political affiliation. This is different from the British parliamentary system, in which the prime minister is the head of government and also the leader of the majority party in Parliament. The CE and LegCo members are elected in separate processes; and the CE shall not belong to any political party, which means that the CE and the SAR government do not enjoy full support in the LegCo, even pro-government parties will change their attitude at any time because they are accountable to the electorate instead of the CE. The result is that the government needs to do more lobbying to get enough support for its policies and has to compromise in many cases. There is always a tug of war between the executive and legislature. Overall, the executive-legislative disconnection is one of the root causes that undermines the executive-led system.
Adhering to the executive-led structure is indisputably a principle the central and the SAR governments have staunchly insisted on. This is because it is not only good for governance efficiency but, most importantly, embodies sovereignty: The central government exercises its sovereignty over the Hong Kong SAR through its power to appoint the Chief Executive and key government officials while the CE is accountable to the central authorities aside from the SAR.
After the promulgation of the National Security Law, the SAR government needs to tackle two tough issues. Firstly, it must try hard to rebuild the relationship with the Legislative Council in the absence of a strong opposition bloc; it matters in terms of winning legislative support within the institutional system. Secondly, it must try hard to achieve zero local COVID-19 infections as soon as possible; it also matters in terms of winning public support outside the institutional system. All of these are crucial to whether the SAR government can consistently and successfully implement the executive-led system.
The author is a member of the Hong Kong Association of Young Commentators.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
