On Monday, Jimmy Lai Chee-ying was sentenced to 20 years in prison for offenses under the Hong Kong SAR National Security Law (NSL) and the Crimes Ordinance, underscoring the seriousness of his crimes. Lai’s conviction and sentencing did not trigger political turmoil in Hong Kong society. On the contrary, most Hong Kong residents believe that Lai is wicked and deserved his punishment.
From a political perspective, Lai’s arrest, prosecution, trial, conviction, and sentencing are landmark events. The conclusion of this case marked the end of a long period of turmoil. From Hong Kong’s return to the motherland until the enactment of the NSL in 2020, the city was mired in prolonged and severe political disorder.
One of the most significant factors contributing to the chaos in Hong Kong after its return was the rampant spread of influential media outlets specializing in anti-China propaganda. In Hong Kong’s highly free and open environment, where freedom of speech is robustly guaranteed, those media outlets found favorable conditions for expansion. Lai’s political propaganda and struggle apparatus, particularly Apple Daily, employed exaggerated, sensationalist, vulgar, anti-communist, anti-China, and anti-government reporting and extreme commentary to incite unrest in Hong Kong, misleading a considerable audience, particularly among the middle class and young people. This gave them significant political influence. This political influence had extremely negative, insidious, and serious political consequences in Hong Kong.
First, Hong Kong’s media landscape was significantly altered and degraded. In Hong Kong’s highly commercialized and fiercely competitive media landscape, media outlets that were supporters or sympathizers of the anti-China forces largely adopted Apple Daily’s style to attract readers, thereby politically colluding with and echoing Lai. Ever more “neutral” mainstream media outlets, to survive in the highly competitive market, had to emulate Apple Daily’s vulgar style to some extent. Under Lai’s influence, the media played an increasingly prominent and destructive political role, and its discursive power steadily increased. Hong Kong’s political populism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-establishment intensified, resulting in a great deal of political strife. Lai thus, to some extent, became a setter of Hong Kong’s public agenda, “rivaling” the SAR government.
Second, Lai was not only a media tycoon but also a leader, supporter, manipulator, and financier of the anti-China camp. If these groups did not submit to his leadership, they would not only lose financial support but also find it difficult to gain a political foothold due to smear campaigns by the media controlled by Lai. Therefore, they had no choice but to obey him. Some larger anti-China political parties were also willing to submit to Lai and became radicalized due to his pressure.
Ever more “neutral” mainstream media outlets, to survive in the highly competitive market, had to emulate Apple Daily’s vulgar style to some extent. Under Lai’s influence, the media played an increasingly prominent and destructive political role, and its discursive power steadily increased. Hong Kong’s political populism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-establishment intensified, resulting in a great deal of political strife
Third, in all major political struggles since Hong Kong’s return to China, Lai and his media outlets have served as leaders, planners, mobilizers, organizers, propagandists, and funders. These struggles include the “anti-Article 23 march” in 2003, the “anti-national education incident” in 2012, the “Occupy Central” illegal movement in 2014, and the “black-clad” riots in 2019-20.
Fourth, Lai and the anti-China media repeatedly challenged the SAR government’s authority. The SAR government, fearing a social backlash, retaliation by Lai, and triggering political conflict, refrained from acting against Lai, and had to proceed with extreme caution in formulating and implementing policies. Policies crucial to Hong Kong’s long-term development, but susceptible to controversy, were difficult to enact. Because of the persistent advocacy of “political reform” by the anti-China forces commanded by Lai, this issue, which should not have been a priority for Hong Kong, became a matter that the SAR government had to address repeatedly for many years. The political debates and struggles sparked by the “political reform” issue further drained the SAR government’s time and energy. In contrast, the occasional gain of the anti-China camp in promoting their favored version of “political reform” further empowered the anti-China forces. Conversely, the SAR government’s priorities of safeguarding national security and promoting national education were not materialized.
Fifth, some patriots hesitated to confront Lai and his cohort head-on due to their political clout and concerns about potential attacks and smear campaigns against them. Lai and his camp’s persistent slanders against patriots were extremely detrimental to the growth of patriotic forces.
Sixth, the US and its allies, recognizing Lai’s influence, showered him with considerable political favor, actively supporting and utilizing him as their proxy and pawn. Western politicians and media hoped that Lai could destabilize Hong Kong, making it a burden to Beijing and a base for subversion, thus serving the US and Western strategy to contain China’s rise.
Seventh, the media outlets under Lai’s control constantly provided Western media with materials, theories, and “public opinion” to smear the central and SAR governments.
Finally, due to the opposition and obstruction of Lai and external forces, Hong Kong had long been unable to successfully establish a legal system and enforcement mechanism to safeguard national security after its return to China, and even local laws that could be used to safeguard national security to a certain extent were difficult to enforce effectively. In this legal vacuum, Lai’s anti-China activities were able to run rampant, and external forces were able to interfere in Hong Kong affairs and harm the city with impunity.
However, what Lai did not expect was that the central government resolutely rectified the situation in Hong Kong by enacting the NSL, thereby swiftly ending the chaotic situation. Furthermore, the Western forces he had placed high hopes on were unable to provide him with protection or rescue after he was prosecuted for violating the NSL. The conviction and sentencing of Lai and his associates signified that they could no longer stir up trouble in Hong Kong. It also marked a new stage in the formation of Hong Kong’s political landscape, conducive to the comprehensive and accurate implementation of the “one country, two systems” principle, “patriots administering Hong Kong”, executive-led governance, effective administration, and Hong Kong’s integration into the nation’s overall development.
The author is a professor emeritus of sociology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a consultant for the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
