Shortly after the promulgation of the National Security Law for Hong Kong (NSL), the Hong Kong Police Force issued an arrest warrant for US citizen Samuel Chu, who was the founder of Hong Kong Democracy Council. Chu was the first foreign citizen to be targeted under the NSL. Unlike the low-profile approach to the handling of Chu’s case, the police are now adopting a high-profile approach by offering a HK$1 million (US$127,900) reward for information leading to each arrest of eight anti-China disruptors accused of violating the NSL. Not surprisingly, these extraterritorial acts have been criticized by Australia, Britain and the US, where the eight fugitives are now living.

The three countries have launched a barrage of criticism of the police’s decision. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government and relevant central authorities have rightly rejected the unfair criticisms from these countries, which should be viewed through the prism of the geopolitical rivalries between China and the US as well as through the deep-seated prejudices created by the blind faith in Anglo-Saxon institutional superiority.

As Bing Ling, of the University of Sydney Law School, has correctly pointed out, from the very beginning, the NSL has been embroiled in international geopolitical rivalries, and any future disputes over the extraterritorial effect of the NSL could very well carry broad political implications (Bing Ling, “Extraterritorial Application of the Hong Kong National Security Law: A New Legal Appraisal”, in The National Security Law of Hong Kong: Restoration and Transformation, Hong Kong University Press).

In a bid to discredit the HKSAR and weaken China, the US has been vocal in its criticism of the NSL since its promulgation. Thanks to bipartisan unity, the US took concrete legislative and executive action against Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Autonomy Act and the Executive Order 13936 came about under the Trump administration. The order implemented sanctions on Chinese officials and HKSAR leaders. To a large extent, the American criticism of the extraterritorial application of the NSL is a facade for Washington’s attempt to use the HKSAR as a Trojan horse to weaken China.

In order to have a proper understanding of the controversy over the cash bounty, we should keep this geopolitical rivalry in mind and desist from automatically viewing the issue of arrest warrants through the distorted lens of Western countries’ perspectives. The hostile attitude adopted by these eight anti-China disruptors toward China and the HKSAR should serve as a critical focus for an independent analysis free from ideological bias which is entrenched in Western-dominated narratives.

The police should draw the public eye closer to the fact that seven of the eight wanted people had appealed for international sanctions against Hong Kong. In the high-profile “primary election” case, the prosecution has alleged that Dennis Kwok was a co-conspirator in organizing the “primary election” to destabilize the HKSAR government.

Although Australia, Britain and the US suspended extradition treaties with Hong Kong following the promulgation of the NSL, the offer of bounties has reminded us that the criminal and security-threatening activities of the eight wanted people are cause for public odium and condemnation. The rewards also reflect the desire of the authorities to issue a fresh warning that the “black clouds” of national security risks are still hanging over the city

These eight individuals were singled out probably because they were alleged to have been involved in serious national security crimes. Since fleeing Hong Kong, some of them have not turned their attention away from the city. For example, Dennis Kwok suggested in a policy report that overseas governments should engage in activities hostile toward China and the HKSAR. Kevin Yam has publicly expressed support for sanctions against Hong Kong judges. Ted Hui and some activists have been vocal in maliciously attacking the HKSAR government.

Although Australia, Britain and the US suspended extradition treaties with Hong Kong following the promulgation of the NSL, the offer of bounties has reminded us that the criminal and security-threatening activities of the eight wanted people are cause for public odium and condemnation. The rewards also reflect the desire of the authorities to issue a fresh warning that the “black clouds” of national security risks are still hanging over the city.

Another warning signal sent by the rewards on offer is that local supporters and friends of the eight wanted people should keep a safe distance from them. Secretary for Security Chris Tang Ping-keung said Hong Kong investigators have taken steps to track down the source of funds that have supported the suspects. It hardly needs emphasizing that these funds are illegal (Articles 21, 23 and 26 of the NSL).

Every sinner deserves a second chance. These eight wanted people should admit their guilt and surrender themselves to the police. Pursuant to Article 33 of the NSL, a penalty may be reduced if the accused person has voluntarily surrendered himself or herself and given a truthful account of the offense. If the court decides to reduce a penalty, it may reduce it from the upper tier to the less serious lower tier (HKSAR vs Lui Sai Yu, CACC 61/2022, para 69).

To conclude, we must treat the criticisms against the offer of bounties for the arrest of eight anti-China disruptors with skepticism. Viewed in light of the geopolitical rivalries between the US and China, the US and its allies have strong motivation to discredit the NSL and the extraterritorial application of the NSL. To be fair, extraterritorial powers exist in the national security laws of other countries. It is now well established that a state may apply its criminal law to the actions committed by a foreigner outside its territory that endanger the security or a limited class of other vital interests of the state (Bing Ling, op. cit, p.241).

In fact, the NSL is a combination of personal jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction and protective jurisdiction, including: 1) offenses under this law that are committed in Hong Kong (Article 36, territorial jurisdiction); 2) a permanent resident of Hong Kong or an incorporated or unincorporated body such as a company or an organization which is set up in Hong Kong, if the resident or the body commits an offense under this law outside Hong Kong (Article 37, personal jurisdiction); and 3) offenses under this law against the HKSAR from outside the region by a person who is not a permanent resident of the region (Article 38, protective jurisdiction).

The author is a Macao lawyer, Macao and litigation and practice senior consultant of Chinese Dream Think Tank.   

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.