Instead of relying on Anglo-Saxon democratic elections to build a façade of legitimacy, some states have succeeded in anchoring their legitimacy on a solid foundation of good governance and performance. Contrary to conventional Western wisdom, these states command a popular mandate by having good records in delivering essential public goods and meeting the socioeconomic needs of their peoples. The causal link between legitimacy and performance has been brought to the forefront of the minds of some distinguished Chinese scholars. Great credit should be given to the academic research done by Yang Hongxing, Zhao Dingxin and Zhu Yuchao on this topic. In the following discussion, I try to use performance legitimacy as an analytical tool to examine whether the widely criticized anti-pandemic policies of the HKSAR government (“the government”) have exerted any adverse effect on its legitimacy. Recently, the attack launched by some commentators and legislative councilors focuses on five fronts, namely border control, contact tracing, social distancing, central coordination and COVID-19 testing.
Firstly, to kick off our discussion with an evaluation of border control policies. In February 2020, over 2,000 members of the Hospital Authority Employees Alliance went on strike to force the government to close all our borders with the mainland. Their protest delivered a bloody nose to the government. Following the adoption of exceptionally effective measures by the mainland authority to contain the pandemic, more and more Hong Kong people realize that it was unnecessary for Hong Kong to close its borders with the mainland. There is great appreciation by the public that border control should focus on health checks at the Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) and post-landing quarantine arrangements. It is hard to dispute that the government still faces a firestorm of criticism because of its alleged failure to implement effective health checks and quarantine policies to flatten the infection curve. Critics found loopholes in the health check mechanism for travelers from high-risk foreign countries.
When virus testing was introduced at the HKIA in the early stages, the loosely monitored DTS-sample-collecting mechanism had attracted mush criticism. Though new measures have been taken to tighten the specimen-collecting mechanism at the HKIA, they are regarded by some commentators as belated piecemeal remedies. Meanwhile, more health check measures have been taken at the HKIA. For example, arriving passengers from specified places are only allowed to land and stay in Hong Kong on condition that they can provide virus-free medical documents for inspection. With regard to early post-landing quarantine arrangements, the government failed to adopt strict measures to monitor arriving passengers during their stay in self-selected hotels for quarantine. For a long period, the scrutiny was lax. With the introduction of compulsory quarantine measures in designated quarantine hotels, arriving passengers shall not leave their hotel rooms nor move around the hotels. But it remains to be seen whether the newly announced quarantine arrangements will rectify the situation.
Secondly, the contact tracing policies introduced by the government are far from satisfactory and they have raised public distrust of their effectiveness. As a preventive device, contact tracing helps us identify those risky groups who came into contact with those infected and it can reduce the costs of testing and quarantining. If properly implemented, contact tracing can help us reduce the number of infections with an unknown source and find the asymptomatic carriers hidden within the risky groups. To our disappointment, the LeaveHomeSafe app is not a popular contact tracing device to track movement and transmission. Should the government take more effective measures to encourage more Hong Kong people to use this app? Besides, the unwillingness of some virus carriers to disclose their movement records has added complexity to the complicated contact tracing mechanism.
Regarding the third front of attack, the government is criticized for its failure to plan and formulate proper and predictable social distancing policies to deal with the fluctuating pattern of infections. With the benefit of hindsight, the government often relaxed social distancing policies prematurely because it failed to strike a proper balance between the need to boost the economy and the need to prevent infections from spreading. Getting the right balance requires erring on the side of caution. With the fourth wave of COVID-19 intensifying in Hong Kong, the government has no alternative but to reintroduce strict social distancing policies to arrest the rising curve of infections. But the imposition of these on-and-off social distancing measures has been regarded by many pandemic-sensitive businessmen as a sword of Damocles hanging over their heads. Difficulties in enforcing social distancing in crowded outdoor areas also merit our attention.
Serious concerns about the lack of central coordination have also been raised by critics. The first real ripples of panic began when there was a serious shortage of face masks in Hong Kong in early 2020. As a result, the government’s nonchalant attitude toward the mask shortage infuriated many Hong Kong people. From a broader perspective, the government seems to believe that markets remain the most effective way of allocating indispensable medical resources at critical times. Without any price control, the prices of masks and other essential medical supplies were jacked up to an unreasonable level. Without central coordination, these medical supplies could not be allocated to the needy in a fair manner. Moreover, central coordination is needed to monitor the hygienic conditions at all legal and illegal boarding houses for domestic helpers. We need to target those risky groups in boarding houses and other unhygienic premises. It is also worth noting that the latest outbreak involves scores of cases centered on private dancing clubs that do not require a license to operate. The Department of Health has great difficulty in monitoring the activities at private clubs. Central coordination is needed to ensure that their activities comply with social distancing restrictions. Finally, inter-departmental cooperation may play an important role in speeding up the transfer to quarantine centers of those who had close contact with virus carriers.
Critics also harbor great grudges against the government’s failure to introduce mandatory mass testing in Hong Kong. Although the government has used up a lot of ink and airwaves writing and talking about the difficulties in launching mandatory mass testing, some Legislative Councilors (such as Mrs. Regina Ip and Miss Mak Mei-kuen) still insist that such a test is necessary. Seen through the economic prism of Mr. Paul Chan Mo-po, mandatory mass testing will help achieve the target of zero local infection. He said persistent outbreaks would be bad for the economy and people’s livelihoods. It should be emphasized inter alia that the central government is keen to see Hong Kong achieve zero infection. At present, the government seems to regard zero infection as a slogan. Too much a focus on the resistance to mandatory mass testing will ignore what ought to be done for the well-being of Hong Kong. Passing legislation on mandatory testing for certain groups (such as domestic helpers in a boarding house at Tai Po) is not enough. Any halfway measure to extend the number of risky groups for compulsory testing should not be regarded as a viable substitute for mandatory mass testing. Anything less will do nothing for public confidence.
The successful mainland experience shows without the slightest room for doubt that mandatory mass testing is the key to finding asymptomatic carriers hidden in the community. Consideration should also be given to the net economic benefits brought by mandatory mass testing. As Joshua Hans has pointed out, pandemics are fundamentally a problem of a lack of knowledge regarding who is infected and who has been infected (Joshua Hans, The Fundamental Information Gap (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2020), p. 104). The goal of mandatory mass testing is to provide such information for the government to make an informed decision on quarantine, targeting asymptomatic carriers in a more effective manner rather than implementing ineffective voluntary virus testing or uneconomical blanket policies that lock down entire regions.
Junius Ho Kwan-yiu is a Legislative Council member and a solicitor.
Kacee Ting Wong is a barrister and a part-time researcher of Shenzhen University Hong Kong and Macao Basic law Research Center.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
