It’s a running joke in my family that I tell each of my grandchildren, in the strictest confidence of course, that they are my favorite. This conspiratorial approach to grandfathering is based entirely on the premise that neither grandchild will speak to the other about my whispered preferences.
I’m sure you’ve immediately spotted the flaw in my Machiavellian technique of building family relationships. However, the fact that I’ve been rumbled by both grandchildren hasn’t deterred me from doubling down on my secret assurances that “you really are my favorite”.
The reason I’m sharing this with you is because a similar strategy has been operating on the world stage for thousands of years. The history of diplomacy is the history of proclamations of everlasting friendship between nations, often ratified by formal alliances, ententes and declarations of “special relationships”.
The flaw in this approach has invariably been exposed when national interests diverge or when a “new best friend” appears on the scene, offering greater diplomatic, economic, security or other benefits, often at the expense of the “old best friend” who gets sidelined, ignored, or even dumped.
We could well be seeing this process in action now if we examine the changing relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. The term “special relationship” has frequently been used to describe the close political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and historical ties between these two countries.
It first came into common parlance after being used in the famous “Iron Curtain” speech by former British prime minister Winston Churchill in 1946. Since then, it has been shorthand for an inseparable, joined-at-the-hip, “you’re my favorite”, Anglo-American alliance. Or so we may have thought.
On closer inspection, however, the “special relationship” had cracks from the very start, with the terminology often being used as more of a public relations exercise, frequently reflecting wishful thinking by the British. By continually using the phrase, the UK hoped that its declarations of grandfatherly favoritism would be reciprocated, bolstering its postwar, post-imperial, declining status in the world.
Letting go of the US “special relationship” mentality is essential for the UK’s progress. ... Britain needs to forge an array of new special relationships across the world, notably in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. China especially is open to closer ties with a Britain no longer feeling obliged to parrot America’s “China threat” narrative.
American policy toward the UK in the immediate period after World War II was a good example of the special relationship not being quite so special. US military aid for Britain during the war had been arranged in accordance with the US’ Lend-Lease Act of 1941. This had attached financial strings to the aid, ensuring that all the military hardware and other essential war supplies lent by the US would be returned or repaid with interest after the war. The financial burden this placed on the UK in the postwar period, on top of its losses during the war, effectively bankrupted the country.
It accelerated the UK’s decline as a major world power, hastened the breakup of the British Empire, and paved the way for the US to become a superpower. It was not until 2006 that the UK was finally able to pay off its lend-lease financial debt to its so-called best friend. So much for the special relationship. I can still recall my father’s mixed feelings toward America, partly because of Britain’s lend-lease indebtedness, partly because of Hollywood’s portrayal of “how the Americans won the war”, and partly because of his perception of pampered American troops stationed in Britain: “overpaid, oversexed and over here”.
Ten years after Churchill’s landmark speech, the special relationship was once again under strain. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, then-US president Dwight Eisenhower threatened to bankrupt Britain by undermining the pound sterling. This was in response to the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt to seize back control of the recently nationalized Suez Canal.
Eisenhower’s administration strongly opposed the invasion, partly to dissociate the US from what it saw as an attempt to resurrect European colonialism, and partly to avoid any distraction from US condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Hungary, which had happened the same week. Eisenhower pressured Britain and France to accept a ceasefire, supported United Nations resolutions condemning the invasion, and approved the creation of a UN peacekeeping force. Washington’s public censure of Britain contributed to the resignation of then-prime minister Anthony Eden in January 1957 and put a big dent in the special relationship.
Fast-forward another decade, and further cracks appeared in the relationship. This time, it was over the US escalation of the war in Vietnam. In 1965, the Labour prime minister at that time, Harold Wilson, to his eternal credit, refused then-US president Lyndon Johnson’s request to send British troops to Vietnam. Instead, Wilson attempted to mediate peace, a move that prompted a withering response from Johnson: “I won’t tell you how to run Malaysia and you don’t tell us how to run Vietnam.”
Despite cracks such as these appearing intermittently in the special relationship, the US and UK have generally adopted a united front, though as with my grandfathering analogy, they haven’t always been the only “favorites”. France has long been a contender for America’s favorite-nation status, seeing itself as its oldest friend and ally. This goes all the way back to the American War of Independence (1775- 83), when French troops and especially the French navy played a pivotal role in the defeat of Britain and the birth of the United States. One hundred years later, in 1886, the Statue of Liberty was presented as a gift from France, marking the continued special relationship between the two countries.
Another contender as US favorite is Ireland, with strong bonds going back to the Great Irish Famine of the mid-19th century and the mass Irish emigration to America. Former presidents John Kennedy, Ronald Reagan and Joe Biden were all proud of their Irish origins, and St Patrick’s Day is still one of the great celebrations in the US calendar.
Similarly, the US-Israel relationship has commonly been described as special, as currently exemplified by President Donald Trump’s unwavering support for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Despite the horrors inflicted by Netanyahu’s regime on the people of Gaza, Trump has been reluctant to condemn Israeli policy and risk alienating the influential Jewish community in America.
Other special allies have included Germany, with then-US president Barack Obama considering then-German chancellor Angela Merkel as his “closest international partner”. The relationship between the US and Canada has also been described as “special”, although Trump’s recent remarks about wishing to annex Canada as the 51st state has rather put a dent in the relationship with this particular favorite nation.
So where does all this leave the special relationship between Britain and America? Despite various Anglo-US difficulties over the years and the competition from America’s alternative “favorite” nations, the trans-Atlantic alliance has generally held firm. However, Trump’s victory in November’s US presidential election could be a game-changer, putting the historic special relationship at risk. Fundamentally, Britain has a clear choice facing it. One choice is to double down on its subservient role as America’s European acolyte, epitomized by Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s sycophantic demeanor toward Trump. The other, bolder choice is for Britain to distance itself from its historical ally, assert its independence, establish new international relationships, and redefine its place in the world.
Starmer is very much a pragmatist and will be nervous about upsetting the special relationship with America. However, he should also be nervous about upsetting the British public by acquiescing with the thinking of a US president whose “America First” agenda is at odds with UK interests and ideals. Political leadership is about inspiring people with a vision for the future, but it’s also about listening and responding to the people when they speak with a strong, unified voice. In both aspects, Starmer needs to think clearly before hitching himself to Trump’s wagon. A recent poll by the Pew Research Center found that 62 percent of British people had no confidence in Trump “to do the right thing regarding world affairs”. This was backed up by a clear majority (across the 24 nations polled) viewing him as “arrogant and dangerous”.
It’s not difficult to see the reasons for this. Trump’s “America First” policies have alienated the vast majority of Britons. Trump’s hostile and disruptive tariffs; his combative attitude toward his NATO allies; his bullying of Canada, Greenland, Mexico and Panama; his apparent disdain for Europe; his retreat from international climate commitments and overseas aid; his televised humiliation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy; his failure to restrain Israel in the destruction of Gaza and the starving of its people; his undermining of the US Constitution, and his attacks on US judges and universities: All these have alienated the British public.
If Starmer wants to retain any respect from his people and offer a principled vision for their future, he needs to stop his sycophantic tribute act toward Trump and adopt a much more independent, balanced, international approach. It’s clearly time for the UK to face up to the reality of its “special relationship” with the US. In truth, it was always a lopsided relationship, with America calling the shots, but with Trump now in charge, the relationship has taken on a toxic quality. Starmer has to walk a tightrope differentiating between the American people, with whom good relations need to continue, and the current American administration which is so detrimental to British interests.
Letting go of the US “special relationship” mentality is essential for the UK’s progress. Like my grandfathering technique, Britain needs to forge an array of new special relationships across the world, notably in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. China especially is open to closer ties with a Britain no longer feeling obliged to parrot America’s “China threat” narrative. It’s time for Starmer to display some real leadership and stop telling Trump, “You’re my favorite”.
David Cottam The author is a British historian and former principal of Sha Tin College, an international secondary school in Hong Kong.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
