Speaking at the annual Reagan National Defense Forum on Dec 2 in Simi Valley, US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo described China as “the biggest threat we’ve ever had. … China is not our friend”. She called on the US Congress, Silicon Valley and the business community to double down on stopping China’s access to advanced technology.
She singled out chip company Nvidia, noting it had developed a product that performs just below the limit set by her department for export to China. “That’s not productive,” she added.
Raimondo made those remarks less than 20 days after President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden met in San Francisco on Nov 15.
Unwilling to play second fiddle to Raimondo, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin took the chance to announce what he called the “most ambitious modernization effort in nearly 40 years for our defense industrial base” at the same forum, with an additional budget request for some $50 billion to be invested in the country’s defense industry.
On the same day Austin made these remarks, it was revealed that the US defense department’s first National Defense Industrial Strategy, which is expected to be published by the end of this year, concludes that while China has risen to become a “global manufacturing power”, the US’ defense industry is unable to meet global demand.
Two days later, on Dec 4, the littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords illegally entered the waters near Ren’ai Reef in China’s Nansha Islands without the prior approval of the Chinese government.
As a part of China, Hong Kong is not immune to the US containment strategy. In an interview with an English-language media outlet on Dec 3, a vice-president of the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong revealed that the US authorities now require Hong Kong exporters that have recently transferred their business to Vietnam to register their company in Singapore and appoint a representative from the city-state. Any company failing to comply with this unwritten rule will be barred from exporting their products to the US market.
These episodes suggest that Washington has no intention of keeping its commitment made at the San Francisco summit to improving Sino-US relations. The US is unlikely to change its view of China as its main rival and abandon its China-containment strategy.
Beijing is earnestly seeking to cooperate with Washington in key areas that concern the future of mankind and the world. It begs the question of whether Washington will put the interests of mankind above its hegemonic interests
Washington has a long-term perspective on its rivalry with China. On Nov 27, just hours before the first China International Supply Chain Expo opened, Biden convened the inaugural meeting of the White House Council on Supply Chain Resilience, unveiling 30 new actions to “strengthen supply chains critical to America’s economic and national security”.
“I believe that 50 years from now when historians look back on this moment, …they’re going to say this was the beginning of when we won the competition for the 21st century,” he said in his speech.
The summit meeting between presidents Xi and Biden in San Francisco suggests that the world’s two biggest superpowers both want to avoid any military conflict, which would be a disaster the world cannot afford.
The Cold War last century featured a bitter standoff between the US and the Soviet Union, yet the two sides occasionally agreed on certain issues, particularly on nuclear arms control. Now that the paradigm shift in global governance has brought about a precarious and capricious global geopolitical landscape wherein a new cold war overlaps with two small-scale hot wars. It behooves China and the US to forestall a nuclear war by forging a healthier bilateral relationship, as well as promoting cooperation and collaboration on issues such as combating global climate change and regulating the development of artificial intelligence. Beijing is earnestly seeking to cooperate with Washington in key areas that concern the future of mankind and the world. It begs the question of whether Washington will put the interests of mankind above its hegemonic interests.
Almost six years into the trade war that Donald Trump’s administration launched against China in 2018, the US and its allies have either reached or seen the limits of their strategic capabilities, whereas neutral states, particularly small and medium-sized countries, are struggling to avoid taking sides in the US-China rivalry.
The end of the COVID-19 pandemic has not ushered in a strong recovery in world trade and the global economy. On the contrary, the world has embarked on the path of reverse globalization, unfettered politicization of economic issues, and fragmenting supply and value chains. While the US maintains a high-interest-rate policy, there is insufficient macroeconomic policy coordination among major powers, and a slew of governments lack the capability to respond to domestic and external challenges. This has caused much concern for global security and growth.
In the face of such a gloomy global situation, Hong Kong should have a sense of urgency to accelerate its integration into national development in the hope of creating a bigger buffer against potential external shocks.
The author is a senior research fellow of China Everbright Holdings.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.