Since Hong Kong’s return to the motherland, it has been pummeled unrelentingly by a slew of minor and major crises, including the Asian financial crisis, the collapse of the property sector, the attack on the Hong Kong dollar’s peg with the US dollar, bird flu, massive demonstrations against local enactment of Article 23 of the Basic Law, the SARS epidemic, the global financial tsunami, protests against national education, the “Occupy Central” insurgence, the “Mong Kok riot”, the violent uprising triggered by the proposed amendment to the fugitive law, and the COVID-19 pandemic. It appears to many Hong Kong residents that crises have become the normal situation or even the ineluctable “destiny” of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
In the years ahead, because of the increasingly turbulent and dangerous international economic, financial, political, military, environmental and health conditions, Hong Kong will continue to live in a hazardous crisis-ridden environment. We can readily anticipate possible “grey rhinos” such as economic downturns, financial crisis, threats to the safety of the Hong Kong dollar peg, unemployment, inflation, mounting political discontent, social unrest, accumulating social grievances, trade blockages, etc., engendered by, among other things, the multitudinous fallouts from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the sanctions and countersanctions thrashed on each other by Russia and the West, friction between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, worsening Sino-US relationship, economic decoupling between China and the West, the hardening stance of the West toward Hong Kong, rising commodity and consumer goods prices, escalating inflation, international financial crises, deglobalization, trade protectionism, food shortages, energy crunch, worldwide economic recession, new pandemics, and regional instabilities and conflicts. Leaving aside these “grey rhinos”, some “black swans” that are not easily detected might also be lurking in the shadows. It is also unavoidable that some of the external threats might be translated into internal unrest in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong must urgently and rapidly upgrade its ability to foresee and manage crises if for no other reason than to avoid or minimize disasters due to the lack of early warnings and preparations
Since World War II and before 1997, Hong Kong was able to prosper in largely normal circumstances, and crises were few and far between. The governance provided by the colonial government and its civil servants was rated as good and competent. Unfortunately, during the crisis-ridden post-1997 period, the performance of the HKSAR government in coping with the crises has been, to speak the truth, below par. Part of the collateral damage is tumbling public confidence in the competence of the civil service.
What is puzzling is that even though the incessant onslaught of crises was the norm in the past and quite likely also in the future, notwithstanding the widely acclaimed effectiveness of the National Security Law for Hong Kong in preventing and suppressing certain types of political crises, the HKSAR government has yet to install a mechanism to foretell and help cope with the possible impending risks which Hong Kong is going to face. The paucity of risk analysis in the government is only the tip of an iceberg of the paucity of strategic, political, and policy studies and the relevant expertise within the HKSAR government. Even a smaller place such as Singapore has greater capability in these important areas as compared with Hong Kong. This can be seen in the existence of several pretty good think tanks both inside and outside the Singaporean government. When I was head of the Central Policy Unit in the Hong Kong government, through regular public opinion polling, analyses of the political situations in Hong Kong, the Chinese mainland, Taiwan and the rest of the world, frequent contacts with the think tanks in Hong Kong, the Chinese mainland and overseas, constant exchanges with local elites from different sectors, the government was able to gain a modicum of insights on the impending risks, coming from within and without Hong Kong, thus enabling it to make some preparation for them organizationally, operationally and in terms of resource acquisition and allocation. However, the shortage of talent and resources of the CPU on one hand, and its loose linkage with other government departments and public bodies on the other, are major obstacles for it to capably play simultaneously the roles of risk analyst, risk forecaster, risk-management adviser, and a go-between with crucial entities inside and outside the government. Consequently, the ability of the government to predict, cope with, analyze the repercussions and deal with the aftermath of the impending crises was quite limited.
Regrettably, the CPU, which was mostly steered by outside experts in the past, was abolished with the coming of Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor as the new chief executive. In its place is the Policy Innovation and Co-ordination Office, which is headed by senior civil servants. Unlike the CPU, PICO was founded apparently on the assumptions that Hong Kong had entered into a stage of political tranquility and thus the major function of the government is primarily administrative, and administrative performance could be improved incrementally through policy innovations of one sort or another. Unfortunately, things turned out to be radically different and unforeseen, as the Carrie Lam administration was battered by two huge crises (the 2019-20 insurrection and the COVID-19 pandemic) whose seriousness is unprecedented not only in the HKSAR but also in colonial Hong Kong. These crises and the way they unfolded were unanticipated and difficult to make sense of. They left the government at a total loss as to the management and termination of the crises. In actuality, the incompetence and fumbling of the government in handling the crises exacerbated the crises and made them more intractable, and both Hong Kong and the country consequently had to pay a hefty price for it. What is most embarrassing is that mismanagement by the HKSAR government has also endangered national security. Ultimately Beijing had perforce to intervene and help Hong Kong overcome the crises. Unavoidably, the inability of Hong Kong to cope with crises capably has thrown a poor light on “Hong Kong people running Hong Kong” and “a high degree of autonomy”.
In the days ahead, Hong Kong must urgently and rapidly upgrade its ability to foresee and manage crises if for no other reason than to avoid or minimize disasters due to the lack of early warnings and preparations. Only with an effective mechanism for risk analysis as the precondition can the necessary policies, operations, intragovernmental coordination, Beijing-Hong Kong collaboration, and resource mobilization in society be put in place as needed to tackle the crises.
To set up an effective risk analysis system for the sake of foreseeing, analyzing, and managing future crises, a policy planning unit much more important, larger and more competent than the former Central Policy Unit is called for, and this unit should be located at the top and center of the government, endowed with enough powers and resources, and be allowed to play a critical role in the governance of Hong Kong.
In the first place, this unit should be fully trusted, work closely with the chief executive, and be highly respected and trusted by the principal officials and the policy bureaus under their charge. This unit should be in close contact with other government departments so that it can gather information and data quickly from them to facilitate risk analysis. The support of the whole government is necessary if this unit is to have enough material to assess the impending risks facing Hong Kong.
Second, compared with the former Central Policy Unit, the risk analysis unit should have a much larger staff and have strong research and analysis ability. In the unit, senior civil servants with intellectual power and outside experts, including experts from the Chinese mainland and elsewhere, should be given a free hand to conduct data collection and research as deemed indispensable to survey the risk situation of Hong Kong.
Third, this unit should maintain close liaison with public bodies such as the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Hospital Authority, the Trade Development Council, etc., so that it can gather information and data from them for more comprehensive studies of the threats coming from inside and outside of Hong Kong.
Fourth, though the private think tanks in Hong Kong are underdeveloped, they nonetheless are a good source of information, early warnings, and advice to the government. Keeping in touch with them, strengthening their research capability, and allowing them to play some role in Hong Kong’s governance by the risk analysis unit will benefit both the government and the private think tanks.
Fifth, this unit should work closely with the major think tanks in the Chinese mainland, particularly in fields such as international relations, national security, terrorism, US-China relations, mainland-Taiwan friction, pandemics and financial warfare. If needed, some risk analysis projects could be outsourced to mainland think tanks.
Sixth, this unit should pay close attention to the changing public mood and opinion of Hong Kong residents, particularly public attitude toward the government and its policies and actions. Public grievances and discontent, which have serious implications for Hong Kong’s stability and governance, must be monitored closely, particularly in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and economic downturns.
Lastly, this unit should work in conjunction with and share intelligence with the national security bodies of the Hong Kong government and Beijing, notably the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR and the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the HKSAR. This is because social, economic, financial, health and political crises in Hong Kong have palpable implications for national security, as amply demonstrated in many crises since 1997.
In a chaotic and turbulent world, and given inexorable and implacable Western animosity toward China, effective governance and long-term stability in Hong Kong depend considerably on a capable risk analysis unit within the HKSAR government which can help it more capably manage the crises and their aftermath. To be effective and useful, this unit needs to be able to collect, collate, integrate, and synthesize a vast amount of information and intelligence gathered through its widespread connections inside and outside the government.
The author is professor emeritus of sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and vice-president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
