In mid-2000, a public housing construction scandal led to a public outcry. People demanded vociferously that the senior officials involved be held politically accountable and be punished for dereliction of duty. However, all the senior officials were career civil servants and could not be removed for political reasons. Under the existing system, only the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is “qualified” to be politically accountable for governmental failure, but it is unrealistic and undesirable to replace the chief executive whenever the need to satisfy public demand for political accountability crops up.

To satisfy increasing public demand for political accountability and, more importantly, to allow the chief executive to form a strong and united leadership team whose members share similar political and policy views, a scheme of political appointments was established at the beginning of the second term of Tung Chee-hwa in 2002. Under this scheme, all principal officials were to be politically appointed and could only serve at the pleasure of the chief executive. Lamentably, probably because the word “political” was too politically sensitive at the time, instead of describing the new arrangement as a scheme of political appointment of principal officials, the term “principal officials accountability system” was coined instead. The political appointment system was expanded in 2008 by adding layers of undersecretaries and political assistants to support the principal officials. Since its inception, the political appointment system was widely understood as an arrangement whereby political appointees could be readily removed from their posts for misdeeds or performing below par. However, as it was rare for a politically appointed official to be sacked, the scheme was considered a farce by a substantial proportion of Hong Kong residents and failed to gain sufficient legitimacy.

In the years ahead, I expect the central government to take the initiative to form a powerful and united governing coalition which will serve as a core and commanding center of the patriotic camp. In the future, with the political appointment system undergirded by and embedded in a powerful and united governing coalition, effective governance in Hong Kong under an “executive-led” government can by and large be achieved

The major shortcoming of the political appointment system is not the rarity of head rolling among politically appointed officials, because this was not the primary purpose of the scheme from the beginning (even in Western countries, cabinet members seldom lose their jobs for political reasons), but the failure of the system to bring about a strong and united leadership team to run the government and command the civil servants. What is worse is that the leadership team lacks a solid and reliable elite and mass support base. Without exception, each of the newly elected chief executives since Hong Kong’s return to China had to form his or her own team of politically appointed officials, most of the time arduously and with less-than-optimal outcomes. Most of the principal officials and other political appointees joined the leadership team in their individual capacity instead of as the “representatives” or “leaders” of particular social or political groups. Nor were they politically influential and popular figures in the community. Therefore, they could not “add to” the political capacity of the chief executive and his or her leadership team by bringing to it broad and strong social support. As a result, the composition of the leadership team changed drastically with the change of the chief executive, and policy continuity and institutional memory suffered accordingly. Furthermore, many of the principal officials did not have previous experience in governance or in working together, hence a lot of time had to be expended to build up team spirit and cooperative relationships. Since principal officials normally could not expect to serve more than one term and had no place or means to sustain their political careers after they left office, many simply exited from politics forever. Inasmuch as political talent is a rare commodity in Hong Kong, this situation is a waste of political assets and cannot entice more elites to seek a political career. As fewer elites are willing to join the government, the civil service increasingly becomes a major source of political appointees. Many political appointees recruited from the civil service are steeped in the conservative ethos of civil servants and lack the boldness, commitment, innovativeness, farsightedness and political sensitivity of political leaders. With the departure of top personnel from the civil service, less-experienced and less-capable successors are promoted to replace them, resulting in a deterioration in the performance of the upper echelons of the civil service, leaving behind a lot of public disappointment with the previously much lauded (probably also over-lauded) public administration of Hong Kong. 

The reason for the lackadaisical performance of the political appointment system of Hong Kong is simple. The system is not undergirded by or embedded in a powerful and united governing coalition supported by the central government and with a broad political and social base. For political appointees to function and govern effectively and forcefully, the chief executive and his or her politically appointed officials should be an integral part of a broad-based governing coalition and play a central role therein. The governing coalition should bring together all the major elites in the political, social, economic, media, educational and cultural sectors of Hong Kong. Unlike the governing party elsewhere, this governing coalition is much looser in organization, more heterogeneous in its membership and interests, and encompassing not only the political elites but also other important elites in the community. The central feature of this coalition is its allegiance to the central government.

If political appointees come from the governing coalition, it is most likely that they have the experience of working together in public affairs before joining the leadership team and can provide strong and effective leadership to the government from the start. The leadership team can also draw steadfast support from the governing coalition and through it mobilize the masses to support the government. Without the support of the governing coalition, it will be difficult for the government to take on the intransigent and recalcitrant political opposition and the disobedient vested interests in Hong Kong. The governing coalition can also function to groom political talent for the government in a systematic manner. Since most political appointees come from the governing coalition, high turnover of the membership in the leadership team can be avoided and hence continuity of governance assured. Moreover, since departing political appointees can remain in the governing coalition by joining groups such as think tanks, media organizations and the commercial enterprises in it, they can expect to rejoin the government with the ascendancy of a new chief executive, thereby maintaining a political career of sorts.

In view of the indispensability of the governing coalition for a strong “executive-led” government in Hong Kong, it is regrettable that a powerful and united governing coalition has yet to be formed. One of the major phenomena stemming from a weak governing coalition is the division between the government and the supposedly “pro-government” legislators, inasmuch as their conflicts cannot be settled by the leadership of the governing coalition overseeing them. Only the central government as a permanent political force can form an enduring governing coalition and enforce its discipline and unity. However, until lately the central government had been reluctant and wary to take up such a large-scale political project. One of the concerns of the central government is that it might be castigated as “interfering” in Hong Kong’s affairs and thus as “violating” Hong Kong’s autonomy.

The situation has changed since the central government grew determined to restore law and order to Hong Kong, to safeguard national security, to ensure Hong Kong is run by patriots, to contain the external and internal hostile forces, and to make sure that “one country, two systems” is comprehensively and accurately implemented in Hong Kong. In the years ahead, I expect the central government to take the initiative to form a powerful and united governing coalition which will serve as a core and commanding center of the patriotic camp. In the future, with the political appointment system undergirded by and embedded in a powerful and united governing coalition, effective governance in Hong Kong under an “executive-led” government can by and large be achieved.

The author is a professor emeritus of sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and vice-president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.