Editor’s note: This is the 12th of a series focusing on the “one country, two systems” principle. 

It is one of the aspirations of Hong Kong people to implement “dual universal suffrage” in the special administrative region as well as the ultimate aim of electoral reforms set by the Basic Law. Unfortunately, the door to universal suffrage was shut by the “pan-democratic” lawmakers, who on June 18, 2015, vetoed the electoral reform package drafted and proposed by the HKSAR government based on the National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s decision issued on Aug 31, 2014 (the “8/31 decision”). 

This was not the first time the “pan-democratic” lawmakers blocked electoral reform. They already vetoed in 2005 another electoral reform package aimed at making the electoral process more democratic. They have since been dubbed by angry residents as the “opposition camp”. 

Arguably, the central government is the leading proponent when it comes to implementing universal suffrage in Hong Kong. ... It is the central government that has set the “ultimate aim” of implementing universal suffrage in the HKSAR in the Basic Law

 Arguably, the central government is the leading proponent when it comes to implementing universal suffrage in Hong Kong. The Sino-British Joint Declaration makes no mention at all of universal suffrage. It is the central government that has set the “ultimate aim” of implementing universal suffrage in the HKSAR in the Basic Law. Article 45 reads “the ultimate aim is the selection of the chief executive by universal suffrage after nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.” Article 68 says: “The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage”. On Dec 29, 2007, the NPCSC reached a decision that set the timetable for implementing universal suffrage for the chief executive in 2017 and for the Legislative Council later (12/29 decision). The “8/31 decision” supplements the“12/29 decision” by adopting specific rules over the election of the chief executive via universal suffrage. “Dual universal suffrage” would have been realized had the “pan-democratic” lawmakers not vetoed the electoral reform package in 2015.

The opposition lawmakers claimed that the 2015 electoral reform package, which includes a “candidate screening mechanism”, is not one for “genuine universal suffrage”, and demanded the withdrawal of the “8/31 decision”. They also demanded modifications in the screening mechanism, including the addition of “civil nomination” and “party nomination” — a move aimed at encroaching on the Nominating Committee’s exclusive power and thus violates the Basic Law. Another modification they asked for was to lower the requirement of obtaining the support of more than half of the Nominating Committee members for a candidate to be qualified to run in the chief executive election. That the opposition camp was opposed to even the rule of majority — a universal democratic principle — suggested that they merely fretted over the gloomy prospect of their candidates joining the race. 

Is it justifiable to have a screening mechanism? To answer this question, one needs to understand the relationship between “one country” and “two systems”. The requirement of “institutional nomination” by the Nominating Committee as stipulated by the Basic Law and the requirement of support by more than half of the Nominating Committee members as required by the “8/31 decision” are intended to help screen out candidates who antagonize the central government, and who eventually would harm national security and Hong Kong’s interests — by means of the wisdom of majority. Although Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy, it is still directly under the central government and is never allowed to oppose the central government or resist its overall jurisdiction over the SAR. Late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping had made it unmistakably clear: “Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong” should mean the administration of Hong Kong affairs by “Hong Kong people, with patriots forming the main body of administrators”. The “8/31 decision” emphasizes that “this is the basic requirement of “one country, two systems’’, and that the method for the selection of the chief executive via universal suffrage must provide institutional safeguards for this requirement. 

Admittedly, nomination is a screening process. In the United States, the presidential candidates are nominated by the two dominant parties, and in the United Kingdom, the prime minister is nominated by the ruling party; both are a form of screening. The chief executive of the HKSAR is accountable to both the SAR and the central government. The role of the chief executive is so crucial to the successful implementation of “one country, two systems” that all candidates are rightly required to pass the nomination process to ensure that only candidates with both majority support and the trust of the central government are able to enter the race.  Moreover, the chief executive-elect will need to be appointed by the central government. Clearly, there can be no compromise when it comes to the “8/31 decision” . 

The author is a veteran current affairs commentator. 

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.