A survey released by the Pew Research Center in July found that views of China have improved in recent years, with favorable opinions gaining ground across many of the 36 countries surveyed.

But differences among countries are as important as this overall trend. Views of China remain more positive in emerging economies than in wealthier countries, and there are also important differences within regions and across generations.

The point is that there is no single global perception of China.

Different societies occupy different positions in the international political economy and look at China through different historical experiences, economic interests, security concerns, and development aspirations.

And this is because perceptions of major powers are, in essence, situated and relational. Countries are evaluated in comparison with alternatives and in relation to the wider international environment.

China’s image is improving partly because China itself has developed so fast, and because more people have direct or indirect experience of its economic and technological transformation. But something else is happening as well: perceptions of China are being affected by changes in perceptions of other major powers.

For this reason, it would be too hasty to frame the current shift simply or directly as a movement toward a multipolar world.

Particularly from the perspective of the Global South, something more complex is happening. What they increasingly seek is greater room for agency. They want to manage interdependence effectively while preserving as much sovereignty as possible.

They want possible cooperation with China, the US, Europe, and regional powers. They want more options in trade, infrastructure, technology, finance, and development.

Although also risky, multipolarity can be attractive not simply because one pole is China, but because the existence of several centers of economic and political power can increase other countries’ strategic autonomy.

Multipolarity is not only a diplomatic phenomenon. It is increasingly visible in production networks, technological infrastructures, energy systems, finance, payment arrangements, and so on.

Significantly, the international order is becoming economically and materially more plural — even if this transformation remains uneven and contested.

The material basis of China’s reputation — infrastructure, transportation, logistics, digital payments, manufacturing capacity, technological adoption, and the impressive scale of urban and rural transformation — is evident.

This helps make clear why China may be perceived differently in other Global South countries, where development, infrastructure, technological upgrading, and greater economic autonomy remain urgent political questions.

This raises a broader sociological question: How is a country’s image actually formed?

Communication and media certainly matter. Public diplomacy also matters. But communication cannot permanently compensate for policies and outcomes. In the long run, perhaps the most powerful form of international communication available to any country is simply what that country actually does.

In this respect, China has done well in sectors where its development has become materially visible to others, such as infrastructure, industrial capacity, trade, technological capability, and, increasingly, green technologies. Its economic relations with many other developing countries have also made China a concrete presence rather than just a distant geopolitical abstraction.

At the same time, in areas where friction persists, it should not automatically be treated as a failure of communication. Concerns about security, political values, regional tensions, or economic dependence can mean real disagreements or conflicting interests. If a negative perception originates mainly in policy or conflicting interests, better communication alone cannot resolve it.

So, will the current shift persist? Here, we must distinguish between structural and cyclical forces.

The structural forces are significant and may favor China: its centrality to global production and trade, its industrial and technological capabilities, the growing economic and political weight of the Global South, and the gradual erosion of a unipolar international order.

However, perceptions are also affected by specific governments, wars, diplomatic crises, economic conditions, and particular foreign-policy decisions. These can change much faster.

For that reason, the fragmentation and growing diversity of global perceptions may persist. The emerging world is likely to be one in which societies increasingly compare multiple models, multiple partners, and multiple centers of power.

The author is a professor at University College Dublin. Some of the views in this article are drawn from the author’s speech at the International Symposium on Shifting Global Perceptions and China’s Future Development, hosted by Renmin University of China and organized by the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies and the School of Global Leadership at Renmin University of China. 

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.