In less than a year, it will be three decades since China resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. It did so by applying the “one country, two systems” formula. The essence of this concept is to foster unification while respecting established history and certain prevailing political-economic realities, alongside safeguarding the fundamental interests of the entire Chinese nation.

Critics of how the formula has been applied in Hong Kong are mainly Western-based. The stridency of this continuous censuring intensified following the hugely disruptive insurrection that evolved in Hong Kong from mid-2019.

Now is a timely moment to consider the facts. In particular, it is instructive to study how the “one country, two systems” framework has coped with the continuous stress-testing it has experienced since its initial application in Hong Kong.

A severe test commenced on day one, when the Asian financial crisis erupted in mid-1997. This financial turmoil soon led to a brazen attack by certain Western speculators on the Hong Kong dollar peg to the US dollar, after which the new Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government delivered a swift, punishing response, with crucial support from Beijing.

Over a decade later, direct political pressures within the SAR challenging the operation of the framework began to intensify.

The Basic Law of the HKSAR established the constitutional basis for applying the “one country, two systems” framework in Hong Kong.

Consistent with the “one country, two systems” formula, the Basic Law sharply varied the enduring British-shaped governance regime which was void of any tangible form of elected participation in government. The Legislative Council was one-third directly elected in 1998, and the Basic Law spells out the ultimate aim of electing both the HKSAR chief executive and LegCo by universal suffrage, “in the light of the actual situation in the HKSAR and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress”.

These Basic Law provisions quickly became the primary focus of political groups in Hong Kong most absorbed in the project of expediting radical electoral reform of the political structures that had underpinned almost 150 years of British rule.

After 1997, the “pan-democrat” camp steadily became almost spellbound by this issue, regularly quarreling about the pace of electoral reform. Attention to many key issues related to people’s livelihoods either fell away — or those issues were recast and slanted to serve their objective of spurring rapid electoral reform. This powerful fixation on accelerated electoral reform, come what may, proved to be the source of the most intense stress-tests applied to the “one country, two systems” framework.

Radical protest behavior subsequently intensified.

In 2014, Hong Kong faced the “Occupy Central” protest, which again demanded rapid, sweeping electoral reform. Severe disorder lasted almost three months. Normal life in Hong Kong was massively disrupted, especially in key business areas.

Then, in 2016, came the Chinese New Year violent political protest in Mong Kok. The Economist said it was “the worst outbreak of rioting since the 1960s. The violence flared amid rumors that officials were trying to clear away unlicensed hawkers selling local delicacies. Reports that some rioters shouted ‘Establish Hong Kong as a country!’ suggest that it was about more than fried food.” Of the 120 people injured, 90 were police officers.

The Financial Action Task Force, established by G7 countries, urged Hong Kong in 2008 to reform its visibly inadequate extradition regime. In 2019, the HKSAR government introduced badly needed extradition reforms. As the government tried to explain the new bill, certain strident media outlets swiftly reframed it (wrongly but successfully) as a fearsome, freedom-threatening law. Major anti-bill marches followed. Soon after, organized political violence on a far-reaching, continuous scale began, and certain opposition members openly sought offshore support — from the United States especially — including intervention to back the growing political upheaval in Hong Kong. On June 12, 2019, a political riot vandalized the LegCo building and stopped it from operating completely. This posed a unique threat to the constitutional order. This swelling political hostility ultimately developed into a destabilizing insurrection, which lasted from mid-2019 into the following year.

The 2019 insurrection confirmed how those most implacably opposed to the HKSAR government — and Beijing — had evolved into an openly violent, disloyal opposition, supported by foreign actors. One in which the radicals set the agenda and sought to upend the constitutional order, insisting that only their preferred political structures were admissible. No responsible group within the opposition dared to step forward to say that the continuous violence was unconscionable and that the insurrection was unsupportable.

For Beijing, it became unambiguously clear that the political insurgency of 2019-20 must not be allowed to recur; foreign actors must never, in future, be permitted such a free hand to involve themselves in destabilizing politics in Hong Kong. At the same time, Beijing remained resolutely committed to supporting the “one country, two systems” framework. Beijing displayed exceptional impulse control in 2019, and did not resort to military force to restore order in Hong Kong. However, it eventually introduced fundamental legal reforms to bolster national security, and the HKSAR government initiated electoral reforms to restructure LegCo. These much-needed reforms have been instrumental in restoring stability in the HKSAR. They also ratified the pivotal importance of the “one country, two systems” framework.

This renewed stability enabled Hong Kong’s remarkable, proven capacity to cope with and recover robustly from adverse experiences and reassert itself.

Today, five Hong Kong universities rank among the world’s top 100. Hong Kong’s role as an international financial center has seen a similar rebound, “reclaiming its spot as the world’s leading initial public offering fundraising venue in 2025”. It was recently reported that British, American and Singaporean companies were among the leading sources of inbound foreign capital to Hong Kong in 2026.

Meanwhile, the HKSAR has regained a fully functioning legislature. The contrast with the previous, rapidly dysfunctional LegCo is stark. We can already see how this beneficial lift has improved the focus on addressing a range of pivotal livelihood issues, including Hong Kong’s serious housing, aged-care, and healthcare challenges. LegCo is now set to play a central role in shaping Hong Kong’s future.

Other indicators show how well Hong Kong has recovered, including the confident development of its first five-year plan, the pivotal Northern Metropolis project, rising visitor numbers, ongoing infrastructure improvements, and the city’s elevated, global rule-of-law ranking.

Hong Kong’s journey since 1997 has plainly not been smooth. It would be in a better place today had this experience been less tempestuous. Nevertheless, it is clear that coping with and recovering from all of these challenges has, despite what a range of Western critics may assert, durably strengthened the “one country, two systems” framework.

The author is a former professor of law at the University of Hong Kong and Monash University, Australia.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.