SCO fosters Eurasia advancement over 25 years

The 25th anniversary of the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on June 15 marks more than a symbolic milestone. Over the past 25 years, the SCO has evolved from a narrowly focused border-security mechanism into one of the largest transregional organizations in Eurasia and a central pillar of the emerging multipolar order.

In a world marked by fragmented globalization, sanctions, conflicts, and institutional crises within the Western system, the SCO is increasingly establishing itself as a contributor to international cooperation, emphasizing sovereignty, consensus, and strategic pragmatism. The SCO is becoming a symbol of resistance against the unipolar development model that some powers are desperate to impose on Eurasian countries.

As a key founding member, China provides investment, logistics, and an alternative development model to that of the West — one based on the principles of respect for countries’ sovereignty, nonviolence, and mutual benefit.

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The organization originated from the “Shanghai Five” mechanism created in 1996 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. At first, it concentrated on confidence-building and demilitarization along the post-Soviet Chinese border. However, the geopolitical dynamics of Eurasian integration soon expanded the mechanism’s scope beyond border security.

On June 15, 2001, in Shanghai, Uzbekistan joined the group, and the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO was signed. Since then, the SCO has undergone several phases of expansion. 

Today, the SCO includes 10 member states, two observer states — Mongolia and Afghanistan — and 15 dialogue partners. The organization’s expanding geography reflects the growing demand for non-Western mechanisms of international coordination.

The SCO’s scale is unprecedented. The combined territory of its member states exceeds 36 million square kilometers — more than 25 percent of the Earth’s land area. The total population of SCO countries is over 3.4 billion, representing nearly half of the total world population.

Economically, the organization already constitutes one of the world’s principal centers of gravity, representing about a quarter of global GDP.

Even more revealing is the organization’s trade transformation. It is estimated that in 2001, mutual trade among the SCO countries was valued at about $16 billion. Today, intra-bloc trade is approaching the historic threshold of $1 trillion.

China and Russia remain the primary engines of this process, but the rapid integration of Central Asian economies demonstrates the broader regional significance of the SCO framework. For smaller member states, the organization has become economically indispensable.

Investment cooperation has grown significantly. Over the past 25 years, mutual direct investment among SCO countries has surged with a primary focus on infrastructure, logistics, energy, and transportation corridors.

One of the organization’s most strategically significant trends has been the transition toward settlements in national currencies. In trade between key SCO countries, the share of transactions conducted in rubles, yuan, rupees, and other national currencies has greatly increased, gradually reducing dependence on the US dollar and Western-controlled financial systems.

Unlike many informal geopolitical platforms, the SCO possesses a fully institutionalized structure. It functions as a formal international organization with a charter, permanent bodies, an approved budget, a secretary-general, and fixed headquarters in Beijing and Tashkent.

Its highest authorities include the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government, and the Council of Foreign Ministers. Specialized institutional mechanisms coordinate cooperation among defense ministers, interior ministers, justice ministries, heads of supreme courts, and procurators-general.

The SCO is a formal Eurasian organization with legal responsibilities and ongoing operations. Security cooperation is also a core aspect of the SCO’s identity. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent oversees intelligence sharing, counterterrorism drills, and anti-extremism efforts — domains that BRICS does not cover.

The SCO has notable similarities with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Both organizations were formed as frameworks for stabilizing Asia through consensus and noninterference. ASEAN has contributed to stabilizing Southeast Asia after the Vietnam War, while the SCO focuses on stabilizing the post-Soviet Eurasian region and China’s western outskirts. In both groups, decisions are made only by full consensus, which upholds sovereignty and guards against domination by any one power.

Three strategic priorities will likely determine the SCO’s future trajectory. First, financial integration across SCO countries strengthens regional economic independence. The proposed SCO Development Bank and SCO Special Account could provide independent financing for large-scale Eurasian infrastructure projects without reliance on other financial institutions.

Second, transport integration would actively advance a unified Eurasian transport network. This framework would connect the Belt and Road Initiative, the Eurasian Economic Union, the North-South Corridor, and the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway.

Third, the SCO brings together some of the world’s largest energy producers and key consumers. It is progressively establishing the groundwork for a self-sufficient Asian energy market, complete with its own pricing structures and settlement systems.

Twenty-five years after its founding, the SCO is no longer merely a regional organization but one of the institutional foundations of the new Eurasian century.

The author is a former prime minister of the Kyrgyz Republic and a visiting senior fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. 

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.