The advent of the question of “Hong Kong’s future” in the early 1980s provided the unprecedented opportunities for the emergence of the “pan-democrats” in Hong Kong. Comprising the already established pressure groups and the emergent political organizations, the “pan-democrats” made effective use of these opportunities to demand democratic reforms from the colonial government and the Chinese government, their rationale being that Hongkongers’ confidence in Hong Kong’s future could only be secured if they were given political power through elections.
The motives behind the “pan-democrats” are complex. They include longing for Western democracy, seeking after political power, crass self-interest, resistance to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), mistrust of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), pursuit of social reform, nostalgia for “colonialism” and illusions about the Western nations. Some “pan-democrats” even put forward the “progressive” slogan of “[Hong Kong’s] return to China as a democracy”. They expected that, by giving assent to Hong Kong’s return to China, Beijing would reciprocate by consenting to democratic reforms in Hong Kong. The “pan-democrats” reckoned that the political powers they obtained through democratic reforms could then be used to resist the CCP and to bring about “peaceful transition” in China.
Because of these political motives, the “pan-democrats” have trodden on an aberrant path right from the very beginning, and, with the changing political situations and public opinions, have now arrived at a point of no return. Today, if the “pan-democrats” are not able to drastically change their political stance and adopt a correct political path, their destination can only be self-destruction. The reason for their current awkward predicament is that the “pan-democrats” do not have the ability and courage to shape political situations and to lead the masses. Instead, by and large they are a political force “swayed” by political situations and “led” by the masses. For a long period of time, they have been very fortunate. Even though they have been “going with the flow”, the political situation and public opinion however have been quite favorable to their expansion. Consequently, the “pan-democrats” not only see no need to adjust their position, but have become even more resistant to change. Since they have no influence on public opinion, any change in their position will be perceived by their “followers” as betrayal and is tantamount to “political suicide”. Therefore, the “pan-democrats” have become increasingly complacent and confined in their “comfort zone”. Unsurprisingly, when Beijing takes draconian measures to rectify Hong Kong’s chaotic political conditions, fundamentally revamps Hong Kong’s electoral system and brings about substantial changes in the political culture of the Hongkongers, the “pan-democrats” are unable to understand and cope with the new challenges by reforming themselves. Now they are at a complete loss and in disarray. Without any exaggeration, the “pan-democrats” are facing an existent life-and-death struggle.
Hongkongers are increasingly suspicious of the appropriateness of their political strategy. Public trust in the “pan-democrats” has tumbled in the last several years because the “pan-democrats” have not disassociated themselves from violence and disorder. It is thus imperative for the “pan-democrats” to remodel themselves in order to survive as a vital political force in Hong Kong
All along, in face with the realities of Hong Kong’s return to China and the implementation of “one country, two systems”, the “pan-democrats” have not been willing and able to craft a series of realistic political goals and devise a practical strategy to achieve them. Instead, they proceed to seize political power in ways fraught with shortsightedness, selfishness, opportunism and utilitarianism. Their political strategy is focused on electoral victories and mass mobilization. At the center of this strategy is struggle and confrontation with Beijing. For a variety of historical reasons, quite a substantial proportion of Hongkongers harbor anti-communist and anti-PRC sentiments. There are also public anxieties and fears about Hong Kong’s future as part of the PRC. The “pan-democratic” have been quite successful in exploiting and intensifying these sentiments with their anti-communist and anti-PRC propaganda. Through this strategy they are also able to enlist the support of the Western forces to put pressure on Beijing. The “representative political reforms” of the departing British, which were in accordance with the strategy of the “pan-democrats”, also provided ample opportunities for the development of the “pan-democratic” forces. In reciprocity, the “pan-democrats” became willing “collaborators” of the British in countering the growing influence of Beijing and the patriotic camp in Hong Kong.
Underlying the “pan-democrats”’ strategy is the belief that Beijing will not take actions against them because Beijing is “afraid of” adverse reactions from the West and “worried about” political unrest in Hong Kong. Undeniably, this strategy has allowed the “pan-democrats” to obtain quite impressive political gains, particularly in the electoral and public opinion arenas. In fact, from the point of view of the “pan-democrats”, this strategy is “rational” and “natural”, and offers a “shortcut” to political power and influence. It is thus no wonder that it became “fixed” and “rigidified” well before Hong Kong’s return to China.
Today and in the foreseeable future, the “pan-democrats” have limited opportunities to get elected into the political bodies of Hong Kong and use the resources thus obtained to strengthen themselves and grow their mass base. Hongkongers are increasingly suspicious of the appropriateness of their political strategy. Public trust in the “pan-democrats” has tumbled in the last several years because the “pan-democrats” have not disassociated themselves from violence and disorder. It is thus imperative for the “pan-democrats” to remodel themselves in order to survive as a vital political force in Hong Kong. However, this is basically an impossible mission unless the “pan-democrats” are able to convince their “followers” that drastic changes in their stance and behavior are good for them and for Hong Kong as a whole. It is also difficult for them, given their historical record, to gain trust from Beijing. As a result, the future for the old “pan-democratic” political parties is bleak, and many younger “pan-democratic” politicians have to leave the political arena reluctantly with a broken political career.
At the same time, the new political environment of Hong Kong affords many opportunities for the rise of the “loyal opposition”. By “loyal opposition” I mean those individuals and groups who are willing to operate within Hong Kong’s new constitutional order constituted by the national constitution and the Basic Law, and are intent on checking and balancing the governing authorities as well as promoting political, economic and social reforms. Some of the old “pan-democrats” with light political baggage might be able to restyle themselves as “loyal oppositions”. It is more likely, however, that new and young faces will emerge to staff the ranks of the “loyal opposition”.
Beijing all along is not against the presence of political opposition in Hong Kong, but it expects it to be constructive and conducive to good governance. I expect Beijing will encourage and help with the rise of the “loyal opposition”. For the existent “pan-democrats”, the strategic goal of Beijing is not to seek their elimination but to try to gain their support to solve Hong Kong’s deep-seated socioeconomic and livelihood problems. If the “pan-democrats” are willing to work together with Beijing and the Hong Kong SAR government on policy reforms, particularly in the areas of land and housing, taxation and social welfare, mutual trust between them and Beijing could be cultivated, paving the way for some “pan-democrats” to become “loyal oppositionists” or even “patriots” in due course. As these will be gradual processes, these “pan-democrats” should also have the needed time to convince some of their “followers” to also change their attitude toward Beijing. If all these congenial developments are realized, the governance, political scene and social conditions in Hong Kong will be much better than in the past.
The author is a professor emeritus of sociology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and vice-president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
